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INTRODUCTION

A labor dispute between a union and employer ordinarily involves

union efforts to achieve recognition or bargaining demands, is tradi-

tionally enforced by strikes and boycotts,' and inevitably results in eco-

nomic injury to the struck business.2 In contrast to labor activities
I The term "boycott" quickly came into common usage after 1880 to describe all forms of
nonviolent intimidation. The word originated in Ireland, following a conflict between Captain
Charles Cunningham Boycott, an agent for absentee English landowners, and the Irish Land
League, a nationalistic organization devoted to securing fixed tenure and fair rent for Irish tenants. After Boycott rejected the League's demands for reduction in rents and summarily evicted
the families on his lands, the League induced Boycott's servants, herders and drivers to desert him,
and directed all of the townspeople to cease their relations with the Captain. Three days after the
ostracism was initiated, local papers refered to the League's activity as a "boycott." The tenant
class thereafter adopted the boycott weapon to harass their English landlords. H. LAIDLER, BoyCOTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS 23-30 (1968).
In the context of labor-management relations, a boycott may be defined as a union's concerted refusal to deal with an employer. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1364 n.5 (1962). Boycotts utilized to obtain bargaining goals are generally
lawful if directed against and confined to the primary employer, that is, the employer with whom
the union has a dispute. The same activities, however, are proscribed if a union attempts to force
a secondary, or neutral, employer or person to cease doing business with "any other person ....
National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
See generally R. DERESHINsKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BOYCOMrS (1972); Goetz, SecondaryBoycotts andtheLMA4l: A4Path Through the Swamp, 19 KANS. L. REv. 651 (1971); Lesnick,
supra.
2 In 1980, 1.4 million workers in the United States were involved in strikes. 106 L.R.R. 113
(1981). Strikes also accounted for more than 31.5 million days lost to affected employers. Id
Neutral employers also may incur economic losses as an intended or unintended byproduct of
labor boycotts. Moreover, neutral employers may be without a remedy against certain boycotts,
for a union is entitled to engage in primary activity no matter how severe the incidental effects on
neutral parties. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967), rehearing
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undertaken to secure bargaining concessions from management are
boycotts motivated by political considerations that transcend the economic relationship between the union and the employer. The adaptation of the labor boycott as a weapon to further political views has
manifested predominantly in union protests directed at foreign governments.3 Protest boycotts4 utilize the resulting disruption of business redenied, 387 U.S. 926 (1967). Additionally, in some circumstances, unions are allowed to direct

boycott and picketing pressures against neutral employers so long as the activity's major impact is
on the primary employer. Where a union "follows the struck product" to a neutral distributor, it
has the right to picket to persuade customers to boycott that particular product. NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964). But see NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (consumer picketing
directed at primary product was illegal where sales of the struck product comprised over ninety
percent of the secondary's gross incomes). Activity is also permitted against the secondary employer when it shares a common situs with the primary employer. Sailors' Union of the Pacific
(Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). Finally, where a purported neutral employer is
sufficiently involved with the business of a primary employer, the union may boycott the "allied"
employer. NLRB v. Business Machs. and Office Appliance Mechanics Bd. Local 459 (Royal
Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
3 See text accompanying notes 24-64 in.fra.
4 For the purposes of this Comment, the term "protest boycott" shall be used to refer to labor
union activities undertaken to voice opposition to government policies whether the government be
domestic or foreign. Historically, strikes motivated by political objectives have been more prevalent in European countries than the United States. See AARON & WEDDERBURN, INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICT A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 320-42 (1972). European political strikes often involve general strikes against governments to achieve specific goals. See CROOK, THE GENERAL
STRIKE 2-9 (1931). For example, general strikes have been undertaken to achieve a definite political concession from the existing government, such as the demand for universal sufferage in the
Belgian general strike of 1913, or, more rarely, for the purpose of upholding the existing government against a would-be usurper, as in the German general strike against the Kapp-Putsch in
1920. The general strike also has served as the tool of revolutionists attempting to overthrow
governments or the industrial system. The Russian Revolution of 1905 is a prime example of a
general strike undertaken for the purpose of forcing large measures of self-government and democratic liberty from an autocracy. Perhaps the most famous political strike transpired in England
when two million workers struck without success in support of miners whose wages were reduced
after government subsidies to coal operators were removed in 1926. See FARMAN, Tim GENERAL
STRIKE OF MAY 1926 (1972); Goodhart, YThe Legality ofthe GeneralStrike in England, 36 YALE
LJ. 464 (1927). The sole general strike attempted in the United States occurred in 1919, when
60,000 workers in Seattle struck in support of dockworkers demanding higher wages. FRIEDHEIM,
THE SEATrLE GENERAL STRIKE 124 (1964). Although many reacted to the strike as a harbinger of
Bolshevism among American labor groups, available evidence points to the fact that revolution
was not actively attempted by the strikers. Id. at 177.
Foreign trade unions have also instituted strikes directed against other governments. Eg.,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, at 8, col. 1 (Canadian, Finnish, Italian, and Norwegian air traffic
controllers boycott U.S. planes to protest U.S. government's dismissal of striking federal employees of Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization); id., Sept. 30, 1973, at 61, col. 5 (French
dockworkers refuse to load military cargoes bound for Chile to protest the military junta in Chile);
Latin Dockers Join Castro Boycott, Bus. WEEK, May 1, 1963, at 50 (dockworkers in ten South
American countries refuse to handle ships of nations trading with Cuba to protest Castro's policies); N.Y. Times, July 15, 1959, at 3, col. 4 (Ghanaian Trade Union Congress members refuse to
handle shipments from the Union of South Africa to protest its apartheid policies). American
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lations between American companies and the foreign nation as a
medium for expressing the union's opposition to particular policies of
the foreign government. Although business may be a neutral party in
the union's dispute with the foreign country, protest boycotts necessarily obstruct American foreign trade, and discourage American companies from participating in international business markets. The recent
refusal by the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) to handle goods bound for or coming from the U.S.S.R.-as a protest against
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-illustrates this variety of politically-motivated boycott activity.5
Remarkably, protest boycotts have induced sparse litigation. This
may perhaps be explained by a widespread belief that federal labor
laws,6 enacted to regulate the relationship between union and employer
are not implicated by union activities of a political and international
nature.7 Accordingly, the response of business to protest boycotts has
labor unions have also organized protest boycotts, albeit on a somewhat more limited scale. These
activities have been directed towards the policies of both state and federal governments. E.g.,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 12, col. 4; id, July 25, 1975, at 41, col. 5 (ILA refuses to load any
wheat shipments destined for the Soviet Union to protest the sale of grain to the U.S.S.R. by the
federal government); id., April 9, 1965, at 65, col. 4 (International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union members in West Coast ports refuse to handle products manufactured in Alabama to
support the civil rights movement in that state). This Comment, however, will focus upon protest
boycotts aimed at foreign governments. This variety of boycott activity is characterized by union
refusals to handle goods bound for or coming from a particular country. The union utilizes the
resulting cessation of business to direct its protest, if only symbolically or through economic force,
toward the foreign government. In contrast to boycotts wherein unions exert pressure against a
primary employer to secure bargaining demands, see notes 1-2 supra, American businesses are
neutral bystanders in protest boycotts aimed at foreign governments.
5 The ILA instituted its protest boycott against the Soviet Union on January 9, 1980. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 1,col. 5. For the text of the announcement implementing the Russian
trade boycott, see note 70 infra. For a discussion of the ILA's protest activities, see text accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
6 Throughout this Comment reference will be made to federal legislation governing labor
relations. The NLRA (National Labor Relations Act) will refer to the Wagner Act, the original
legislation enacted in 1935 which created the National Labor Relations Board and established the
right of workers to bargain collectively. NLRA, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1976)). Congress amended the NLRA with the TaftHartley Act of 1947, and added new provisions including a class of union unfair labor practices
and various private causes of action to enforce rights created by the legislation. Labor-Management Relations Act [hereinafter cited as LMRA], Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 1-503, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976)). In 1959, Congress further amended the labor
statutes with the Landrum-Griffin Act, which among other changes, strengthened the secondary
boycott provisions of the LMRA. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [hereinafter
cited as LMRDA], Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 1-531, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1976)). Unless otherwise indicated, "Act" and "NLRA" will refer to the statute that
resulted from the combination of the NLRA, LMRA, and LMRDA.
7 The chief authority representing the view that the National Labor Relations Board has no
jurisdiction over union activities undertaken for political purposes is NLRB v. Local 1355, Int'l
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been to yield to labor pressure and cease trading with the foreign country under union censure, to endure passively the economic effects of the
boycotts, or to turn to the federal government for assistance in countering union activity.8 Administrations, when prodded into action by
affected private concerns, have limited their support for business to
general statements condemning protest boycotts and supporting American participation in foreign trade.9 Even when labor union conduct
was perceived to interfere with American foreign trade policy and undercut federal control over international relations, administrations
have preferred to resolve the problems caused by protest boycotts
through negotiation, rather than legal action.' 0
The recent Russian trade boycott differs markedly from the typical
acquiescence characterizing previous protest activities. Numerous legal
challenges to the ILA's protest boycott were asserted by business firms
suffering from the effects of the union conduct.I Yet, while the reluctance to assert legal challenges to protest boycotts has receded, the litigation arising from the Russian trade boycott demonstrates the difficult
legal problems brought to fore in examining protest boycotts. Can protest activity be regulated under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)? Are legal remedies available to a private party injured by a
protest boycott which interrupts his participation in foreign trade? If
labor union activity interferes with the foreign policy of the United
States, then in what circumstances should federal control be exercised?
Underlying these questions exists the inherent tension between labor's
use of the protest boycott weapon and the objectives of American foreign trade policy which encourage the formation of business relations
by American companies with other nations. The Russian trade boycott
of 1980-81 provides an opportunity to study and resolve these conflicting interests.
Part I of the Comment examines the Russian trade boycott, and
Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964). In this case, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the Board lacked jurisdiction over a boycott calculated to eliminate trade
with Cuba as the union conduct did not involve a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the
NLRA. Id at 995. Numerous courts and commentators have also asserted that the NLRB lacks
jurisdiction absent the existence of a labor dispute. See Danielson v. Fur Dressers Local 2F, 411
F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Peak v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 304 So.2d 796, 801
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Eastern S.S. Lines, 211
So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); T. KHa-EE LABOR LAW § 8.02[2] (1979); AARON &
WEDDRmuRN, supra note 4, at 322; MoRRis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 761 (1971).
8 See text accompanying notes 24-64 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 24-41 frf-a.
10 See text accompanying notes 44-45, 49-56 i./ra.
11 For a discussion of the legal challenges to the Russian trade boycott, see note 92 and text
accompanying notes 85-97 in.fra.
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compares the boycott to ILA protest activity over the past three decades. 12 The survey of protest boycotts demonstrates the wide range of
business interests disrupted by union conduct and the extent to which
such activities may undermine American foreign policy. Part II analyzes whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)
may assert jurisdiction over protest boycotts. 13 The jurisdictional reach
of the NLRA will be explored with emphasis upon a line of Supreme
Court decisions involving foreign-flag vessels. Particular criticism will
also focus upon the Fifth Circuit's recent decision concerning the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the ILA's boycott in Ba/dovin v.
InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation. 4 Part III examines whether

a protest boycott constitutes a secondary boycott proscribed by the
NLRA.' s A theory construing section 8(b)(4) of the Act 1 6 to prohibit

protest boycotts will be presented. The theory is then compared to the
analyses of the First Circuit in Allied International,Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Association,17 and the NLRB in InternationalLongshoremen's Association, Local 799 (Allied International,Inc.),' 8 two

cases dealing with the application of section 8(b)(4) to the Russian
trade boycott. Finally, Part IV discusses foreign policy considerations
implicated by protest boycotts directed at foreign governments. 19 Rec-

ognizing the constitutional power of the federal government to restrain
12 See text accompanying notes 20-97 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 98-167 infra.
14 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
15 See text accompanying notes 168-280 infra.
16 NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). The relevant portions of § 8(b)(4) provide
that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ....
(4)(i)to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal
in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is ....
(B)forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to
tion as the representative of his employees under
recognize or bargain with a labor org
the provisions of section 9; Provided that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing ....
Prior to 1959, what is now the first portion of subparagraph (B) was found in subparagraph (A).
Thus, many pre-1959 cases refer to § 8(b)(4)(A), while more recent decisions refer to § 8(b)(4)(B).
To ease analysis and avoid confusion, this Comment will refer simply to § 8(b)(4), unless otherwise indicated, in discussing the secondary boycott provisions of that paragraph.
17 640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1981).
18 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. 1033 (Aug. 28, 1981).
19 See text accompanying notes 281-303 infza.
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protest boycotts, this Comment concludes that federal authority should
exist to quell union activities that threaten foreign policy objectives and
the conduct of international relations.
I.

PROTEST BOYCOTTS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE

ILA

A labor union is an organization of workers that exists to promote

the economic interests of its members.2° While concern over international affairs would seem irrelevant to that purpose, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO
or Federation) has formulated and presented policy positions on foreign affairs issues on behalf of its membership since its inception in
1955.21 Indeed, the efforts of the Federation have gone beyond a mere
self-interest in foreign trade and tariff laws, to include advocating the
recognition of particular foreign governments and criticizing the conduct of foreign relations by our own government. 2 Further, similar to
20 The primary function of a modem union is collective bargaining. It is through collective
bargaining that employees obtain a relative equality of bargaining power with their employer,
because the collective bargaining process compels the employer to deal with workers not as individuals but as a group. See generally BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 2-3 (1977).
21 The foreign policy of the American labor movement is a distinct phenomenon which has
been the subject of scholarly writing. See C. GERSHAM, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AMERICAN
LABOR (1975); R. RADOSH, AMERICAN LABOR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1960);
Godson, The,4FL ForeignPolicy Mal'ngProcessFromthe Endof World WarII to the Merger, 16
LAB. HIST. 325 (1975). At the first meeting of the AFL-CIO, the Federation adopted a lengthy
foreign policy statement which sought to "help our nation evolve and execute an effective democratic foreign policy." DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST CONSTrrIUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 101 (1955) (report of the Resolu-

tions Committee on Foreign Policy). To achieve this objective, the Federation would endeavor to
influence government decision-making "through democratic processes." Id
George Meany, the late President of the AFL-CIO, best expressed the philosophy underlying

the Federation's concern with international affairs. He asserted that:
[t]here are alot of people who think that we have no business getting involved in foreign
policy. They think foreign policy should be left to the politicians or the professors. They
seem to think that the workers of America have no interest-or no stake-in what happens in
We have as much right as anyone else, and are as determined, to speak out
this world. ...
on matters of foreign policy-because we have a real stake in foreign policy.... More than
that, we have a deep dependency on the survival of freedom in this dangerous world. For,
without freedom,. . . unions cannot flourish. And a world without unions becomes a vast
sweatshop. . . and thereby threatens the living standards of all Americans. So if idealism is
no longer persuasive in these cynical times, we stake out a bold claim of self-interest.
DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONSTrruTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 22-23 (1973) (opening address of George Meany).
22 Foreign policy issues are a frequent subject of discussion at most AFL-CIO conventions
and executive committee meetings. These debates have sometimes resulted in the censure of particular foreign governments. DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 223 (1975) (resolution
condemning government of Indira Ghandi for repression of freedom in India); id at 450 (resolution expressing disapproval of the British government's administration of Northern Ireland);
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other groups exercising the first amendment right to petition the government, the AFL-CIO influences foreign policy decision-making
through its lobbying activities designed to persuade legislators, officials
and the public to adopt its views.2 3
The ILA has distinguished itself among American labor unions for
the frequency and intensity of its protests against the policies of foreign
governments the union considers inimical to its own interests, and that
of the United States. In contrast to the lobbying efforts of the AFLCIO, longshoremen have sought to influence foreign policy through
protest boycotts designed to interfere with business relationships that
American firms have established with foreign nations under the union's
interdiction.
The ILA's opposition to the policies of foreign governments has
manifested in refusals to load or unload goods destined for or coming
from particular foreign countries. In view of the essential role maritime unions play in the transportation of goods through international
channels,24 an inevitable effect of the ILA's protest boycotts has been
DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONsTIruTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 78-80 (1973) (resolution approving of economic sanctions
instituted against Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa by black African nations); DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 420-36 (1957) (resolution condemning the U.S.S.R's invasion
and occupation of Hungary). The AFL-CIO has also concerned itself with our own government's
conduct of international relations. See, e.g., Detente" HearingsBefore the Sen. Comm on For.
Relations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 371-411 (1977) (statement of George Meany criticizing administration policy fostering detente); DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 270-83 (1967)
(resolution supporting United States involvement in Vietnam War).
23 Political activism is one of the expressed goals of the AFL-CIO. It devotes a great deal of
effort to informing legislators on the objectives of labor and to advising the public about the
voting records of various candidates. The Federation also has legislative representatives on Capitol Hill and has a special committee, known as the Committee on Political Education, to campaign
for acceptance of favorable legislation. See generally Holloway, The PoliticalMachine oftheAFLCIO, 94 POL. SCI. Q. 117 (1979).
24 To enable vessels to safely transport their cargoes, it is important that the cargo be well
stowed, that the vessel keep her trim, and that one portion of cargo may not injure another by
contact, leaking, fumes, or heat. The business of stowing ships and of breaking out cargo at the
port of delivery is conducted by stevedore companies. These firms employ longshoremen to load
and unload cargo. See 1 KNATH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 235 (7th ed. 1974).
Longshoremen are unionized in every American port. The ILA represents approximately
77,000 maritime workers in 478 locals in ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and in the Great
Lakes. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS
AND EMPLOYEE AsSOCIATIONS-1979 33 (1980). Thus, any goods traveling through these ports will
be handled by ILA members. As a result, concerted action by ILA locals can have a devastating
effect upon foreign commerce. See, eg., U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 147 F. Supp.
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (strike among ILA unions enjoined as national emergency as industry-wide
work stoppage threatened health of national economy).
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the disruption of American foreign trade. A significant byproduct of
these protests is also the interference with American foreign policy
posed by the longshoremens' disagreement with these policies or unwillingness to conduct themselves as the policies require.
A brief survey of the ILA's protest boycotts illustrates not only the
effectiveness of these campaigns in impairing trade with various foreign
countries, but also the failure of our government to eliminate union
interference with the conduct of American foreign policy. A focus
upon the ILA's activities thereby provides a frame of reference for subsequent analysis and discussion of the availability of legal relief for
private concerns injured by protest boycotts, and the propriety of intervention by the federal government to restrain such conduct.
A.

The ILA and Foreign Governments

1. ProtestBoycotts Against the MilitaryAggression of Foreign
Governments
Communist governments have been the principal targets of the
ILA's protest activities. In turn, Soviet military interventionism has
been the major motivating force for many of the boycotts the union has
organized during the past three decades.
The first boycott campaign implemented by the ILA originated in
1950 to protest the involvement of the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China in the Korean War. ILA locals in the port of New

York initiated the protest boycott by announcing their refusal to service
Russian ships or handle cargoes bound for the U.S.S.R.25 As sporadic
boycott incidents spread to other ports and affected a significant
amount of shipping worked by the union,26 President Truman rebuked
the ILA and cautioned its locals to refrain from intruding in foreign
policy matters.2 7 Nevertheless, the ILA's executive committee backed
the locals, and officially endorsed a boycott of Soviet ships and goods.2"
Despite the complaints of affected shipping companies, the union's
25 N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1950, at 52, col. 2; id, Sept. 1, 1950, at 41, col. 1. The first ship
affected by the boycott was a Czech vessel transporting cargoes to the Soviet Union. Id, Aug. 28,
1950, at 35, col. 2.
26 Id, Sept. 1, 1950, at 41, col 1. ILA members in the port of Boston concurred in the boycott
and also refused to handle cargoes. In addition, Transport Workers Union members in New York
City airports joined in the campaign. Id, Sept. 2, 1950, at 31, col 5.
27 Id, Sept. 1, 1950, at 41, col 1. The media also criticized the ILA locals in New York and
Boston for trying to set foreign policy. See, e.g., COMMONwEAL, Sept. 1, 1950, at 500, col. 1.
28 N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1950, at 63, col. 1. After President Truman's warning, the ILA's Atlantic Council backed the boycott activity undertaken by the locals and forbade its members from
handling Russian goods "except those vital to defense or the economy" of the United States. 1d
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leadership later extended the boycott to cover'products coming from or
destined for the People's Republic of China and Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe.2 9
The ILA thereafter continued its policy of refusing to service Soviet ships and cargoes throughout the Cold War era on an informal
basis.3 0 Locals often ignored the policy as the union's executive committee did not strictly enforce the boycott policy in Atlantic coast ports
worked by ILA members. 1 Protest boycotts were officially reinstated,
however, during periods of Soviet military aggression.
In 1956, longshoremen refused to handle goods bound to or coming from Soviet-bloc countries to protest the Russian invasion of Hungary.32 ILA locals in the harbor of New York expanded the scope of
the boycott to include diplomatic materials and baggage of Eastern European diplomats arriving at the United Nations. 33 After the State Department expressed fears of retaliation against American embassies, the
ILA eased the boycott, and exempted diplomatic consignments to Soviet satellite diplomats and consular personnel. 34 Similarly, in 1968,

the union implemented a boycott of all goods destined for Russia and
its Eastern European allies to protest the occupation of Czechoslovakia
by Warsaw Pact troops. 35 Exceptions to the boycott were again made
29 Id, Sept. 21, 1950, at 47, col. 2; id, Nov. 8, 1950, at 59, col 6. In response to protests from
stevedore companies, ILA President Ryan declared that "this might teach them not to do business
with the Russians and her allies." Id, Sept. 7, 1950, at 63, col. 1. The ILA's Atlantic Council,
however, lifted the boycott of Soviet satellite countries under government pressure. Id, Sept. 24,
1950, at 106, col. 8.
30 United States ports were essentially closed to Soviet shipping during the 1950's because of
the absence of bilateral shipping agreements between the two nations. See ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE: ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGE TO THE WEST 26 (1979). Thus, longshoremen registered their opposition with the Russian

government by refusing to handle U.S.S.R. cargoes carried on non-Soviet vessels.
31 The economic structure of the Atlantic and Gulf coast longshore industry is such that the
many ports worked by ILA members are independent product markets. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 2 (Jan. 1968). Because gains in one
port are often made at the expense of another, the loyalty of ILA members lies in local union
leaders rather than the union's executive committee. Id Accordingly, ILA locals in South Atlantic ports have often ignored the union's official boycott policy. See N.Y. Times, May, 29, 1967, at
50, col. 5.
32 Id,

Oct. 30, 1956, at 10, col. 5. ILA President Bradley asserted that the union would "re-

fuse to load or unload cargoes until the armies of the Soviet oppressors leave the soil of free
Hungary." Id
33 Id, Nov. 10, 1956, at 38, col. 1; id, Nov. 11, 1956, at 37, col. 2; id, Dec. 1, 1956, at 13, col.2.
34 Id, Dec. 13, 1956, at 74, col. 1. At the requests of Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy,
the ILA's executive committee also urged locals in Norfolk and Baltimore to ease their boycotts
against Soviet-bloc countries. Id
35 Id, Aug. 24, 1968, at 16, col. 2. In justifying the boycott, ILA President Gleason stated that
the union's decision was "prompted by the cowardly attack by [the Soviet-bloc countries] along
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to ease State Department apprehensions concerning foreign reprisals.
Neither the ILA's protest boycotts instituted during the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian crises nor during the Korean War were ever challenged in the courts.

2. ProtestBoycotts Organizedto Object to ParticularPolicies or
Actions of Foreign Governments

The ILA has also engaged in boycotts organized for the purpose of
condemning particular policies adopted by foreign countries in governing their own internal affairs. Generally, the union's paramount
concern has been human rights. Accordingly, the apartheid policy of
the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) has subjected
both countries to protest boycotts initiated by longshoremen.3 7 The repression of political rights by the Pinochet regime in Chile has likewise
precipitated boycotts by the ILA.3" Moreover, in 1979, shortly after the
seizure of American diplomatic personnel in Tehran by Iranian militants, the ILA refused to load or unload any cargo destined for or coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran39 Finally, and most recently, the
with the Soviet Union, on their neighbor, Czechoslovakia, whose new liberal government had
extended additional freedoms to its people." Id
36 Id
37 In 1963, the ILA called upon the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) to convene a conference of
longshoremen from major ports of the world to explore the possibilities of a world wide industrial
boycott against the Republic of South Africa on account of its apartheid policies. The AFL-CIO
also supported the ILA's position. DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 265 (1963). In March,
1972, an ILA local, with the backing of the union's executive committee, refused to unload a
shipment of Rhodesian chrome in Burnside, Louisiana, on account of the African nation's white
supremacist policies. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1972, at 2, col. 6; id, Mar. 22, 1972, at 5, col. I.
38 Id, April 8, 1979, at 8, col 1. See also DAILY PROCEEDINGS & EXEcUTIvE COUNCIL REPORTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE

AFL-CIO

406-07 (1979) (resolution supporting ILA boycott of Chilean goods to protest Chile's banning of
trade unions).
39 N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1979, at 12, col. 2. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), which represents longshoremen on the West Coast, joined in the boycott of
Iran. [1979] 284 INTL TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-2. Its action immediately
affected 100,000 metric tons of paper which were due to be shipped from Portland, Oregon, to Iran
aboard the Hoegh Opel Id The Transport Workers Union of America (TWUA), which loads
and unloads air cargo, also joined the ILA's lead, and refused to handle cargoes carried by Air
Iran originating from U.S. air terminals. Id at A-1. Additionally, the International Association
of Machinists (IAW)stopped servicing Iranian planes in American airports. [1980] 4 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at A-4. Railroads linked to port areas also experienced bottlenecks as the Brotherhood of Airline and Railway Clerks (BRAC) declined to handle rail cars with cargoes destined for
Iran. Id
The ILA's boycott in East and Gulf Coast ports stalled shipments of grain, oil drilling equipment, and other machinery. [1979] 284 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-1.
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union instituted a twenty-four hour boycott on May 7, 1981, against
British-owned ships to protest the death of IRA political prisoner
Bobby Sands, and to underscore "its opposition to the actions of the
British government in Northern Ireland and... its continuing support
for fundamental human rights throughout the world."' Of limited duration and economic effect, these boycotts did not produce litigation or
arouse State Department objections. 4'
The union action affected Iran more severely than the asset freeze and other sanctions implemented by the Carter administration. As Iranian funds to pay for U.S. food exports were exempted from the assets freeze order, Iran successfully contracted to purchase considerable
amounts of grain. Id As a result of the ILA's boycott, and that of other unions, however, U.S.
exports to Iran were effectively blocked. As a result, the Khomeini government had to seek alternative sources to make up for import losses. The significance to Iran of the protest boycott is
suggested by the fact of Iran's dependence upon imports for 35% of its domestic consumption, of
which one-quarter came from the United States.
The leadership of the ILA, in conjunction with the ILWU, IAW, BRAC, and their Canadian
affiliates, called upon the London-based International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), an
international organization of transportation workers, to undertake "world-wide industrial action
against Iran in retaliation for that country's holding of American hostages. [1980] 4 DAILY LAD.
REP. (BNA) at A-4. The ITF, however, refused to take substantive action, or to issue an official
policy statement supporting the steps to stop Iranian shipments. [1980] 11 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at A-1.
In this country, the AFL-CIO officially supported the Iranian boycott. Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, asserted that the ILA's action "... . is a perfectly normal, spontaneous
reaction of workers faced with an opportunity to demonstrate how they feel about the conduct of
Iran, [and] the seizure of Americans as hostages... . I certainly will do nothing to discourage
that action .. " Remarks of Lane Kirland, Columbia Broadcasting System interview on "Meet
the Press," Washington, D.C. (Nov. 25, 1979), reprintedin [1979] 284 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-2. Kirkland also suggested that he would not discourage a boycott
by longshoremen of Soviet grain shipments from the U.S. if the U.S.S.R. were to sell wheat to Iran
to counter their loss of American imports. Id
After the United States-ran Accord ending the hostage crisis was signed on January 19, 1981,
Iran resumed its purchase of American grains. [1981] 348 IN'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) at C-I. More than two months later, on March 27, 1981, the ILA announced that
it had lifted its boycott of cargoes bound to or coming from Iran. Interview with Mr. Lawrence
Malloy, Public Relations Dep't, ILA, New York, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 1981). In terminating the boycott, ILA President Gleason lauded the union's membership for their support "in a united effort to
convince terrorists that holding innocent diplomats is a violation of international law and against
our human dignity as Americans." [1981] 352 INTL TRADE REP.U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at
C-6.
40 [1981] 88 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-9, 10. In a resolution adopted by the union's Atlantic Council, the ILA leadership asserted that "as the membership.. . believes that the unification
of Ireland is the only way to bring an end to the sufferings and the violations of human rights in
Northern Ireland[,]. . . . [olue of the most visible ways to draw public attention to these wrongs
is through peaceful public demonstrations.
...Id at A-10. The ILA also boycotted British
ships in 1972 following disturbances between the IRA and the English government. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1972, at 12, col 7.
41 The ILA has also participated in American maritime union protests against the Arab boycott of Israel. Unlike the protest activities discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-40, this
boycott produced substantial foreign dislocations. In 1960, the Seafarers' International Union
(SIU)picketed vessels flying the flag of the United Arab Republic to protest Egyptian curbs on the
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ProtestBoycotts Intended to Further U.S. ForeignPolicy

Interests
The ILA has also implemented protest boycotts in situations where
the union perceived that American foreign policy measures were inadequate to protect the interests of the United States. Notwithstanding the
motivations underlying the ILA's activity, these boycotts have tended
to impair the government's conduct of international relations.
The ILA instituted protest boycotts in the late 1960's to assist in
the Vietnam war effort. Under the maritime policy formulated by the
U.S. government, five foreign ships had been disqualified from carrying government-financed cargoes, but administration policy did not
prohibit these ships from entering American ports to pick up private
cargoes, nor did the disqualification apply to other ships under the
same flag or ownership. 2 In 1966, the ILA announced that its members would refuse to load vessels of all foreign countries trading with
North Vietnam unless the administration took effective steps to stop
allied nations from engaging in such trade.4 '
After the ILA's boycott interfered with the access of several European shipping firms to U.S. ports, the State Department criticized the
union, and indicated that the national interest would best be served by
continuing to seek a solution on a government-by-government basis.'
The Johnson administration, however, succumbed to the wishes of the
freedom of the seas, loss of seamen's jobs due to the Arab boycott, and mistreatment of SIU
members on American ships passing through the Suez Canal. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1960, at 62,
col. 6; i4, April 21, 1960, at 61, col. 5. When ILA locals joined in the picketing of UAR vessels in
New York Harbor, the owner of one of these vessels, the Cleopatra, unsuccessfully sought to
enjoin the picketing in federal court. See Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (relief denied as federal courts have no power to grant injunctive relief in

admiralty).
The union actions evoked retaliatory picketing of American shipping in the Middle East.
N.Y. Times, April 19, 1960, at 74, col. 2; Id, May 6, 1960, at 1,col 3. UAR officials endorsed the
boycott of American vessels, and condemned the United States government for its failure to control American maritime unions. Id, April 28, 1960, at 70, col 8. The Eisenhower administration
urgently attempted to negotiate with the unions through AFL-CIO President Meany. Id, May 4,
1960, at I, coL 3. Under Secretary of State Dillon began extended discussions with AFL-CIO
Special Counsel Arthur Goldberg, and reached a settlement on May 6. Id, May 7, 1960 at I, col.
6. The union agreement to stop picketing was made in return for a detailed statement of government principles on maritime policy issued by the State Department, including a committment that
the government would consult with the AFL-CIO and its maritime unions on future developments
affecting American vessels and seamen in the Middle East and would take new steps to halt Arab
blacklisting. See 42 STATE DEP'T BULL. 834-35 (1960); N.Y. Times, May 8, 1960, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
42 N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1966, at 1, col. 4.
43 Id

44 Id, Feb. 26, 1966, at 52, col. 2.
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ILA by adding more ships to the government blacklist.4 5 Thereafter,
the union's executive committee did not compel locals to follow the
ILA boycott policy toward North Vietnam.
The ILA did, however, direct boycotts against foreign governments critical of American involvement in Vietnam. In 1968, the union
refused to handle Swedish ships and cargoes to protest that government's aid to North Vietnam, and acceptance of American military deserters.' Further entanglement in foreign affairs arose when the ILA
refused to handle goods bound for Australia to protest that government's criticism of American participation in Vietnam.4 7 Australian
dockworkers had instituted a strike against all U.S. shipping to place
economic pressure on the American government to influence its Vietnam policy. 48 The ILA acted in retaliation, and lifted its boycott only
after the Australian government pressured its unions to cease their
strike of American shipping.4 9

The protest boycott campaign which posed the most significant interference with federal control over international relations was the
ILA's boycott of Cuba from 1960 to 1964. Essentially, the boycott
arose on account of the longshoremen's disagreement with the government's measures to control foreign trade with Cuba. While President
Kennedy attempted to secure the cooperation of Western European
countries in a blockade of the island in 1962, the administration also
decided to close American ports to ships that on the same continuous
voyage were delivering goods to Cuba. 0 Believing that the govern45 Id, Mar. 4, 1966, at 2, col. 4. After the administration added more foreign ships to the
blacklist at the behest of the longshoremen, ILA President Gleason declared that the union and
the Government were "pretty near agreement" on "what has to be done to stop non-Communist
trade with North Vietnam." Id
46 In 1968, the ILA boycotted Swedish ships because the Swedish government had welcomed
American military deserters from Vietnam. Id, April 22, 1968, at 46, coL 5. The next year, the
union picketed Swedish travel liners to protest Sweden's plan to provide $40 million in aid to
North Vietnam. Id, Dec. 9, 1969, at 54, col. 2. One newspaper editorial commented that the ILA
was "back at its favorite game of transfering the State Department at Foggy Bottom to the even
more foggy waterfront" and that "it is up to the State Department, not the Metternichs of the
docks to decide what-if anything--the United States should do about the whole thing." Id
47 Id, Jan. 4, 1973, at 3, col 1; id, Jan. 6, 1973, at 6, col 4.
48 Id, Jan. 5, 1973, at 2, col 2.
49 Id, jan. 10, 1973, at 2, col. 6.
50 ADLER-KARLssON, WEsTERN ECONOMIC WARFARE: 1947-1967 106 (1968). All foreign
ships carrying ammunitions to Cuba were barred from American ports. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1962,
at 1, col. 6. Additionally, foreign vessels visiting Cuban harbors were not allowed to visit United
States ports to pick up commercial cargoes for return trips to Europe. Id As European countries
were extensively involved in Cuban trade, the policy pursued by the Kennedy administration bore
most heavily on European-flag ships. ADLER-KARLSSON, supra, at 106.
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ment solutions were "meaningless" and "weak action,"'51 the ILA instituted a total boycott of all ships engaged in Cuban trade.52 The union's
actions evoked State Department fears that the boycott would complicate relations with European allies,53 and provoked complaints by foreign governments.54
The administration gradually toughened its stance against Cuba.
In 1963, it established a blacklist to prohibit individual foreign ships
trading with Cuba from carrying American-financed cargoes.55 Despite this policy, the ILA rejected a State Department request to modify
its stance, and indicated that its boycott would continue to apply to all
ships trading with Cuba regardless of the vessel's status on the government blacklist. 56
The administration's increasing inability to eliminate the ILA's interference with foreign commerce led private parties to challenge the
protest boycott under federal labor laws. In Ocean Shipping Service,
Ltd (Local 1355, International Longshoremen's Association),57 an

American stevedore firm asserted that the union's refusal to supply its
members for work on a vessel which had engaged in Cuban trade violated section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. This provision provides in pertinent
part that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
...to engage in... or encourage any individual employed by any per-

son engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to... handle or

work on any goods ... or to perform any services ... where an object

thereof is ...forcing or requiring any person.., to cease doing busi-

ness with any other person...

51 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1962, at 1,col 6.
52 Id ILA locals had engaged in selective boycotts against foreign shippers carrying Cuban
cargoes since 1960. Id, Jan. 5, 1961, at 6, col 3. The boycotts spread to numerous Atlantic ports.

Id, Jan. 7, 1961, at 8, col 3; Id, Jan. 12, 1961, at 3, col. 8. Moreover, despite the warnings of

President Kennedy that such conduct complicated foreign policy, the boycotts continued sporadically. id, Mar. 10, 1961, at 6, col 1. Litigation began when the boycott spread to include the
Orient-Mid-East-Great Lakes Service, which the ILA alleged was under the same ownership as
Orient-Mid-East Lines, whose ships had traded with Cuba. Id, Oct. 26, 1962, at 62, coL 1; id,

Oct. 27, 1962, at 50, col 1. The boycott against the company's vessels ended only after both firms
agreed to divert cargoes bound for Cuba, to refuse other Cuban cargoes, and to drop suit against

the ILA. Id, Oct. 30, 1962, at 70, col 1.
53 Id, OCt. 9, 1962, at 1, col 6.
54 Id, Oct. 6, 1962, at 5, col 7.
5 For a discussion of the United States policy toward Cuba during the early 1960's, see
Penello v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F. Supp. 164, 167-68 (D. Md. 1964). See

also note 50 supra.
56 N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1964, at 58, col 5; id, Mar. 29, 1964, at 16, col. 4.
57 146 N.L.R.B. 723 (1964).

58 NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
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Since the ILA's stated objective was to eliminate trade with Cuba,
the stevedore argued that the union's boycott contravened section
8(b)(4) because it forced neutral firms "to cease doing business" with
other companies trading with Cuba. In defense, the ILA contended
that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the alleged unfair labor practice
because the union's refusal to handle Cuban cargoes and ships on political grounds did not constitute a "labor dispute" within the meaning of
the NLRA.
The Board rejected the "labor dispute" requirement as a limitation
on its jurisdiction, and found that the ILA's politically-inspired conduct violated section 8(b)(4).59 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.60 The court interpreted the NLRA as conditioning the Board's
jurisdiction on the existence of a labor dispute.6 As the "union activity
• . .pertains to a general political question," 62 the court reasoned that

the Board lacked jurisdiction over the protest boycott. Yet, despite this
determination, the Fourth Circuit went on to review the merits of the
Board's decision.63 The Ocean Shipping court found that there was no
secondary boycott since both elements necessary for a section 8(b)(4)
violation---(l) "threats, coercion or restraint," and (2) "an object of
forcing or requiring any person.., to cease doing business with any
other person . . ."-were absent. In support of its conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the refusal to work one ship did not constitute "threats, coercion or restraint," and maintained that the union's
only object was the elimination of trade with Cuba.'
The foregoing discussion of the ILA's protest boycott campaigns
demonstrates that private parties have been hesitant to challenge union
activities in court. Prior to the numerous legal challenges asserted
59 146 N.L.R.B. at 727. After unfair labor practices were filed with the Board, the regional

director successfully petitioned for an injunction under § 10(1) to restrain the ILA's boycott pending adjudication of the complaint. Penello v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F.

Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964). For a discussion of the role of§ 10(1) injunctions in restraining alleged
unfair labor practices, see notes 83-84 infra. The district court also rejected the union's contention

that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction absent a labor dispute. 227 F. Supp. at 170.
60 NLRB v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 146 N.L.R.B. 723,
rev'd, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
61 Id at 995.
62 Id at 996.
63 To justify its departure from the practice of courts to avoid the resolution of issues not in
controversy, the court explained that as "we are dealing with a case of first impression and one
likely to be offered for review on certiorari, we deem it appropriate to consider further questions

that would arise if the Supreme Court should take a different view of the jurisdictional issue." Id
Despite the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, the NLRB did not subsequently apply for certiorari. See
Recent Cases, 78 HA~v. L. Rnv. 463, 465 n.11 (1964).
64 332 F.2d at 998.
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against the Russian trade boycott, the Ocean Shiping opinion consti-

tuted the sole pronouncement regarding the NLRA's application to
protest boycotts. Perhaps the reluctance to seek legal remedies against
protest boycotts might be attributed, at least in part, to a variety of
practical and political considerations. Supplementing these considerations, however, may well have been the impediment to legal relief created by the decision of the Ocean Sho7ping court to clothe protest

boycotts with a cloak of immunity from the NLRA.
B. The Russian Trade Boycott of 1980-81
In December of 1979, armed forces of the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan. 65 In response, President Carter decided to halt or reduce
exports of grain and high technology to the U.S.S.R. 66 Pursuant to the
authority given him by the Export Administration Act of 1979,67 the
President issued orders implementing an embargo on grain shipments
and high technology exports destined for Russia.68 Imports were not
65 Three Soviet divisions, the vanguard of an eventual occupying force of 85,000 troops,
pushed across the Russian-Afghanistan border on December 22, 1979. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1979,
at 1, col 5. Their initial mission purportedly was to save the Russian-installed government of
Babruck Karmal from a rebellion by bands of Moslem tribal guerrillas. One year later, the Soviet
military had all but abandoned hopes for a quick victory. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 22,
1980, at 26. See also Rubinstein, Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan, 79 CURRENT HIST. 80 (Oct.

1980).
66 For the text of President Carter's statement announcing trade actions against the U.S.S.R.,
see 16 WEEKLY CoiP. OF PREs. Doc. 25 (Jan. 11, 1980). In addition to halting exports, the
President took other measures to condemn the Soviet invasion, -including recalling the United
States ambassador from Moscow to Washington, asking the Senate to defer further consideration
of the SALT II Treaty, and delaying construction of any American or Soviet Consular facilities.
Id at 26-27.
67 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III
1979)). Under the 1979 Amendments to the Act, the President has authority to suspend shipments
of goods for national security reasons or foreign policy considerations. Id at §§ 2404-2405. For a
discussion of the imposition of governmental restrictions on private commercial exports for the
purpose of furthering particular goals of United States foreign policy, see Abbott, Linking Trade to
PoliticalGoals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s and1980s, 65 MIN. L. REv. 739
(1981).
68 On January 7, 1980, Commerce Secretary Klutnick announced that validated export
licenses were required to export all U.S. agricultural commodities and products to the Soviet
Union. 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). Prior to this action, agricultural commodities could be exported
to the U.S.S.R. through the use of general licenses. See [1980] 290 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. ExPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-6. Two days later, President Carter directed that all existing licenses
for high technology and strategic exports to the Soviet Union be suspended and that all shipments
be frozen pending completion of the ongoing review of technology exports to Russia. 45 Fed.
Reg. 3027 (1980). The suspension order affected approximately 500 validated export licenses involving high technology goods worth over $155 million. [1980] 290 Ib1lL TRADE REP. U.S. ExPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-I. As foreign policy export controls automatically expire one year
after imposition unless the President extends them, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413(b) (Supp. HI 1979),
President Carter extended the controls on exports bound for Russia on January 7, 1981. 46 Fed.
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affected. However, the President chose to exclude from the embargo
the outstanding amount of unshipped grain committed under a 1975
agreement between the two nations regulating the purchase and sale of

grain for supply to the Soviet Union.6 9
Shortly thereafter, on January 9, Thomas Gleason, the president
of the ILA, instructed the union membership to boycott U.S. shipments
destined for Russia and to deny services to Soviet-flag ships entering
American ports.7 0 Gleason asserted that the directive came "in response to overwhelming demands by rank and file members of the
union" reacting to the Soviet threat to world peace.7 1 In addition, the
executive committee of the ILA adopted a resolution prohibiting locals
72
from handling any cargo bound to or coming from the Soviet Union.
Reg. 1665 (1981). For a discussion of the changes in export controls instituted during the Russian
trade embargo, see Abbott, supra note 67, at 874-75 n.803.
69 Under the terms of the 1975 grain deal, the United States agreed to allow sales of six million metric tons of wheat and corn to the Soviets. Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Supply of Grain, Oct. 20, 1975, [1975] 26 U.S.T. 2971, T.I.A.S. No. 8206. Although the agreement
permitted Russia to increase its purchases by up to two million metric tons above the six million
ton sale limit in any twelve month period without consultation, id at 2973, the Soviets had only
augmented the agreement's sale limit to 8 million metric tons at the time of President Carter's
suspension order on January 7, 1980. See [1980] 289 INT'L TRADE REp. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY

(BNA) at A-1, 2. The suspension of general export licenses essentially forbid the export of 17
million metric tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of 8 million metric tons committed under the earlier agreement. Id at A-2. As of December 1980, approximately 5.6 million
metric tons of grain covered by the agreement had been shipped to Soviet destinations. Id at A-3.
Although the President decided to honor the committment levels, the suspension order also required that validated export licenses would be required for the 3.5 million metric tons remaining
to be shipped under the agreement. 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980).
70 The directive issued by the union hierarchy stated as follows:
In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain and other foods

as well as high valued general freight. [sic] However, any Russian ship now in process of
loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion.
The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affected relations between the U.S. & Soviet Union.
However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the
workers.
It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions
of the world.
People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership
concurs.

Press Release of Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Jan. 9, 1980), reprintedin Walsh v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 524, 526 n.1 (D. Mass. 1980).
71 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 1, col 5.
72 Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1980, at 2, coL 2. In contrast to the boycott of Iranian goods and ships,
see note 39 supra, the ILA failed to gain support for the Russian trade boycott from its West Coast
sister, the 90,000 member International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. Id The
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As a consequence, ILA locals in Great Lakes, Atlantic and Gulf Coast

ports refused to refer their members through hiring hall arrangements
for work involving Russian ships or cargoes.73
In comparison to the export controls implemented by the Carter
administration, the ILA directive was considerably broader in scope.

The ILA directive prevented not only the loading of grain and other
cargo licensed for export and exempted from or not covered by the
administration's embargo, but also the unloading of any cargo arriving
from Russia.74 Gleason proclaimed that the ILA boycott expressed the
ILA reported, however, that a West German longshoremen's union had agreed to follow the
Gleason directive and refuse to handle Russian cargo in West German ports. Id, Jan. 11, 1980, at
7, coL 1. Additionally, Canadian dockworkers, all pilots working the Suez and Panama canals,
and Australian longshoremen expressed support for the ILA boycott, but nonetheless declined to
join in the refusal to handle Soviet cargo. [1980] 290 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. ExPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) at A-7.
73 Under a hiring hall agreement, an employer promises to hire only those persons referred to
it by the union, and the union agrees to refer applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis, i.e., without
regard to their membership or non-membership in the union. A labor contract providing for a
non-discriminatory hiring hall is legal, absent the actual practice of discrimination under the
agreement. International Brhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 674 (1961). Thus, hiring
halls serve as a means "to eliminate wasteful, time-consuming, and repetitive scouting for jobs by
individual workmen and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers." Mountain Pacific
Chapter, 119 NLRB 883, 896 n.8 (1958), enforcement denied on other grounds, 270 F.2d 425 (9th
Cir. 1959). The hiring hall arrangement is utilized most frequently in the maritime and construction industries. See MoRRis, supra note 7, at 712.
74 Some members of Congress also advocated an embargo on Russian trade. On January 22,
1980, Senator Weiker (R.-Conn.) introduced legislation calling for the imposition of a total trade
embargo against the Soviet Union pending its withdrawal from Afghanistan. S. 2200, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rc. S37 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1980); S. Con. Res. 64, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REc. S38 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1980). Subsequent measures sought to restrict AmericanRussian trade in specific commodities. S. Con. Res. 76, 96th Cong., 2d, Sess., 126 CONG. Rnc.
S1453 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1980) (to prohibit export of fertilizers to the Soviet Union); S. Rns. 373,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S1778 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1980) (to impose an embargo on
export sales to U.S.S.R.); S. Con. Res. 15, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Ruc. S2410 (daily ed.
Mar. 19, 1981) (sense of Senate that Soviet grain embargo be expanded to include all other export
commodities); H. Res. 563, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H606 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1980) (to
prohibit the export of phosphate fertilizer to Russia); H. Con. Res. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REc. H295 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1980) (to block sale and export of fertilizers to Soviet Union);
H. Res. 30, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H133 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981) (urging newly
inaugurated Reagan administration to continue grain embargo imposed by President Carter).
Meanwhile, a bill that would deny Soviet vessels access to U.S. ports until the U.S.S.R. withdraws its military forces from Afghanistan was introduced February 5, 1980 by Representative
Shumway (R.-Cal.). H.R. 6424, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H534 (daily ed. Feb. 5,
1980). In bringing the bill to the House floor, Shumway asserted that "the east and gulf coast
longshoremen had the right idea, [for] if we are serious about responding to Soviet actions, we
should go farther than just limiting exports." Id Moreover, a House resolution introduced January 30, 1980 by Representative Murphy (D.-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Merchant Marine
Committee, and 37 co-sponsors, called for an immediate suspension of U.S. maritime agreements
with the Soviet Union after 90 days notice. H.R. Con. Res. 269, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG.
REc. H427 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1980). The Murphy resolution sought to bar Soviet-flag ships from
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conscience of union workers against contributing to the economic or
military well-being of a nation that they considered a serious threat to
the United States.75 Further, the ILA leader argued that the longshoremen were not attempting to set foreign policy, as the union activities
were in the nature of a political protest.7 6

As a result of the Carter administration's suspension of all grain
contracts requested by the Soviet Union that exceeded the 1975 grains
agreement limit, the ILA boycott affected only the 3.5 million metric
tons that remained to be transported under the terms of the 1975 compact.77 In addition, however, the longshoremen's actions affected all
other goods which were exempted from the government's export control system. As a result, the boycott succeeded in blocking the ship-

ments of these commodities, for excessive amounts of grain and
inadequate storage facilities to handle the backlog of Soviet orders
snarled ports worked by ILA locals.7"
Consequently, Carter administration officials voiced their concern

that the union's actions usurped the foreign policy prerogatives of the
President.7 9 The administration's response, however, was limited to
seeking an end to the ILA's boycott through negotiation with the
union's hierarchy. Yet, this strategy failed for despite President
Carter's meeting with ILA leaders and his proposal that the union lift
its boycott to allow exports to leave American ports, the union's executive committee reaffirmed that the longshoremen would continue their

action unless enjoined by the courts.8 0 Defeated in its attempts to per-

calling on 40 U.S. ports open to the U.S.S.R. under a 1976 maritime agreement, and would have a
further effect on 30 other U.S. ports that handled Russian cargoes from non-Soviet vessels. [1980]
293 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-12. The Carter Administration, however, vigorously opposed the measure as being inconsistent with the interests of American foreign
policy. See [19801 299 IN 'L TRADE RE!'. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-19.
75 Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1980, at 2, col 2. The NLRB and several courts considering legal
challenges to the ILA's boycott rejected the assertion that the Gleason directive merely expressed
the overwhelming desire of the union's membership. See note 258 infra.
76 Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
77 Id See note 69 supra.
78 See [1980] 291 INT'L TRADE RE'. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-2. For example, five
grain export terminals in Houston and Galveston, Texas stopped accepting grain shipped by barge
and railroad car. The terminals were filled, and operators could not secure buyers for the Sovietbound grain. Id The ILA boycott affected virtually all of the 3.5 million metric tons excluded
from the President's export controls, since only 150,000 metric tons were scheduled to be shipped
from West Coast ports. Id at A-4.
79 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 1, coL 5.
80 Id., Jan. 18, 1980, at 9, col. 5; id, Jan. 20, 1980, at 37, col. 6. See also [1980] 293 INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY

(BNA) at A-14.

In August of 1980, the ILA threatened to open another avenue of protest against the Soviet
Union by expanding its boycott to include Poland. Specifically, union president Gleason inti-
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suade the ILA to end its boycott, the administration thereupon proposed to assume the outstanding grain contracts frustrated by the

union's activity."'
With the boycott preventing the loading and unloading of cargoes
belonging to various parties, several exporters and importers responded

by filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB against the ILA
and the particular locals involved. 2 The legal theories underlying
these suits were similar to the challange to the Cuban boycott which the
Fourth Circuit had rejected sixteen years earlier in the Ocean Shioping
case. In general, the parties charged that a refusal by the union to han-

dle goods associated with the Soviet Union constituted an illegal secondary boycott as the work stoppage was an attempt to force shippers,
carriers, and stevedores to cease doing business with the U.S.S.R. or
with each other.

After investigating these charges, the NLRB adopted a similar
characterization of the ILA's conduct. 3 As a result, while the charges
were pending with the Board, three regional directors brought actions
in federal district courts seeking preliminary injunctions against the
boycott under section 10(1) of the NLRA. 4 In Baldovin v. International
mated that the longshoremen would boycott cargo to and from Poland in support of striking
workers should the Polish government fail to grant their demands. [1980] 166 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at A-3. Gleason postponed the planned boycott amid reports that Poland's communist
leadership offered concessions that could bring an end to a strike by 20,000 Polish workers. Id
The executive committee of the AFL-CIO supported the ILA position and sent letters to the
ITWF and ITF urging them to take similar action. Id at A-3, 4. Moreover, the International

Association of Machinists disclosed that its members would refuse to handle air cargo going to
and from Poland should the Polish government refuse to grant the workers' demands. Id at A-3.
After concessions were granted by the Polish government, however, the ILA canceled its
threatened boycott.
81 See [1980] 294 IN'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-5. Legislation was

also introduced to authorize the repurchase of embargoed grain, and alleviate the effect of lost
sales upon farmers. See S.2258, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rc. S981 (daily ed. Feb. 5,
1980); H.R. 6238, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. HI16 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1980).
82 See [1980] 293 ImN'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-14, 0-1. Three unfair
labor practice charges were filed with the regional offices of the NLRB in Massachusetts, Georgia,
and Texas. Id at A-14.
83 Section 8(b) of the NLRA creates six unfair labor practices. NLRA § 8(a)-(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)-(e) (1976). The Board may not act until an unfair labor practice charge is filed with a
regional office of the NLRB alleging a violation of the Act on the part of an employer, a labor
organization, or their agents. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1981). Thereafter, the charge is investigated by a Board agent from a regional office, and upon completion of the
investigation, the NLRB's regional director determines whether a formal complaint is warranted.

Id § 102.15.
84 Section 10(1) provides in pertinent part that
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of paragraph 4(B)... of section 8(b) .... and the... regional attorney... has
reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue ... [he]
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Longshoremen'sAssociation,8 Judge Black of the Southern District of
Texas denied the regional director's petition on the ground that the

boycott was not "in commerce," and therefore, the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. In the second of the section 10(1) proceedings,
Mack v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association,6 Judge Edenfield
of the Southern District of Georgia rejected the union's assertion of res
judicata on the basis of the Texas decision, found jurisdiction in the

Board, and issued the requested injunction as probable cause existed to
believe that the Act had been violated. That order enjoined ILA locals
from refusing to perform work in the ports of Savannah and Brunswick, Georgia on account of any grievance concerning shipments of

cargo to or from the Soviet Union.87 Finally, in Walsh v. International
Longshoremen'sAssociation,88 Judge Skinner of the District of Massachusetts also rejected the claim of res judicata, and found jurisdiction
over the boycott under the NLRA. However, the court denied the peti-

tion on the ground that the boycott was protected by the First Amendment. 9 The rulings of both the Texas and Georgia district courts were
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 90 That court, in Baldovin v. International
Longshoremen's Association,91 affirmed the decision of Judge Black in

finding that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over protest boycotts, and
reversed the issuance of an injunction by Judge Edenfield.
shall, on behalf of the Board, petition.., for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final
adjudication of the Board with respect to the alleged secondary boycott.
NLRA § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 150(1) (1976). Mandatory injunction proceedings under § 10(1) are
available only in certain situations where union actions have the potential for subjecting employers to substantial damage over short periods of time. Specifically, § 10(1) provides that charges
filed under § 8(b)(4)(A),(B), or (C), 8(b)(7) or 8(e) (secondary boycott, hot cargo agreement, recognitional picketing, etc., charges) give jurisdiction to district courts to grant injunctive relief. Id
85 No. H-80-259 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 1980). In Baldvin, the Kansas, Texas and American
Farm Bureaus filed complaints after ILA locals in the port of Houston refused to supply longshoremen so that a Belgian ship could load grain being purchased by the U.S.S.R. from an American grain dealer. Id slip op. at 2.
86 104 L.R.R.M. 2892 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1980). Mack involved refusals by an ILA local in
Savannah to unload Russian ammonia imported by Occidental Chemical Company, and a similar
incident in Brunswick, Georgia, where ILA members declined to service a ship transporting imports of Soviet potash for Occidental. Id at 2893.
87 Id at 2893-95.
88 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980). In Walsh, an ILA local in Boston refused to unload
shipments of wood imported from Russia on American ships. Id at 526.
89 Id at 529.
90 In addition, the Walsh decision was appealed to the First Circuit. See Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir. 1980). However, the court of appeals did not
reach the merits, but instead remanded with instructions to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
In the court's view, the denial of an injunction by the district court in Baldovin precluded additional § 10(1) petitions. Id at 876.
91 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
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In addition, one importer brought an action in federal court in
Boston seeking damages caused by the Russian trade boycott under
section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). 92 This
cause of action provides that a suit may be maintained in federal dis92 See note 94 infra. The importer, Allied International, also challenged the ILA's protest
boycott on the grounds that the union's activities constituted (1) a violation of§ 1 of the Sherman
Act, and (2) a maritime tort. Both of these arguments were rejected by the district court and later
on appeal by the First Circuit. See Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F.
Supp. 332 (D. Mass. 1980), aftd, 640 F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir. 1981). Allied International subsequently
filed a writ of certiorari, currently pending before the Supreme Court, to vacate the judgment of
the First Circuit with regard to its antitrust and maritime tort claims. See Allied Int'l, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir.), cert.pending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3883
(filed May 5, 1981) (No. 80-1906).
Other employers adversely affected by the Russian trade boycott sought to enjoin the ILA's
activities under § 301 of the Act. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This provision provides
that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Id § 185(a). In
these cases, members of multi-employer bargaining groups who were parties to labor contracts
with ILA locals brought injunction actions alleging that the boycott violated their collective bargaining agreements. As the contracts contained detailed grievance provisions, mandatory arbitration procedures, and no-strike clauses, the employers argued that they were entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief pending arbitration of any grievance the ILA had over the companies' shipments
of cargo to or from the Soviet Union.
Employers met with varying success at the district court level Several courts enjoined the
boycott pending arbitration as the work stoppage breached broad no-strike obligations. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1408, No. 80-81-Civ-J-B
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 1980); Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Locals 1248 & 1963, Civ. No. 80-186-N (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 1980); Carolina Shipping Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1422, C.A. No. 80-0873-1 (D.S.C. May 7, 1980). In contrast, one court refused to issue an injunction pending arbitration since the collective bargaining
agreement at issue lacked a specific no-strike obligation. John W. McGrath Corp. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1294, No. 80-CV-150 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1980). Finally, one court
enforced three arbitrators decisions wherein ILA locals had been adjudged to have violated contractual no-strike obligations. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ILA
Local Union No. 1418, 486 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1980).
The decisions in JackonvilleBulk Terminals,New OrleansShopingAssociation, andHampton
Roads Shoping Association were appealed to the Fifth and Fourth Circuits. These courts dissolved each injunction issued in the lower courts, for in their view, the Supreme Court's decision
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), precluded injunctive
relief pending arbitration of a grievance which an employer had no power to eliminate. Hampton
Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Locals 1248 & 1963, 631 F.2d 282
(4th Cir. 1980); New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local Union
No. 1418, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980) (consolidated cases). The Supreme Court has accepted
certorari in the JacksonvilleBulk Terminals case. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local Union No. 1418, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.grantedsubnonL,
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1408, 49
U.S.L.W. 3722 (Mar. 31, 1981) (No. 80-1045). A petition for certiorari is still pending in Hampton
Roads ShippingAss'n. Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Locals 1248 & 1963, 631 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.), cert.pending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3496 (filed Dec. 17, 1980)
(No. 80-1058).
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trict court for damages resulting from "any activity or conduct defined
as an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4) of the [NLRA]. '93 In
Allied International,Inc. v. InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation,94
the district court dismissed the suit relying on its earlier decision in

Walsh that the union's activities did not constitute an illegal secondary
boycott. On appeal, however, the First Circuit reversed this determination, concluding that Allied had stated a valid cause of action under
section 303. 9 5 Though the decision in Allied Internationalwas confined
to a consideration of whether the challenge to the Russian trade boycott stated a cause of action under section 303 of the LMRA, the First
Circuit's conclusion is in effect a repudiation of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Baldovin.
Finally, after the three separate cases concerning the section 10(1)
injunctions and the section 303 damage suit had been adjudicated by
the First and Fifth Circuits, the Board reached a decision on the merits
in the unfair labor practice charges which had been pending against the
ILA for nearly nineteen months.9 6 In InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation, Local 799 (Allied International,Inc.)," the NLRB determined that it possessed jurisdiction over the Russian trade boycott, and
concluded that the ILA's activities violated section 8(b)(4) of the Act.
Yet, while the Board's decision, like the First Circuit's opinion inAllied
International,rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Baldovin,
the NLRB's analysis of the ILA's boycott differed in significant respects
from that of the First Circuit.
The inconsistency of results involving virtually identical sets of circumstances, and the conflicting and disparate analyses employed by the
Board and the numerous courts confronting the ILA's boycott, is illustrative of the novel legal questions posed by protest boycotts. To determine whether protest boycotts are subject to regulation under the
NLRA (and assuming that the Board possesses such jurisdiction, the
93 LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
94 492 F. Supp. 332 (D. Mass. 1980).
95 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981). As

the First Circuit determined that a protest boycott violates § 8(b)(4), the court reversed and remanded for further consideration of Allied International's claim for damages under § 303 of the

LMRA. Id at 1379. The Supreme Court has subsequently granted the ILA's petition for certiorari to review the First Circuit's conclusion regarding the union's liability under § 303. See Allied
Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3245 (Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1663).
96 The first of three unfair labor practice charges was filed on January 23, 1980, approximately
two weeks after the ILA instituted its boycott. See [1980] 40 DAmY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-4.
97 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. 1033 (Aug. 28, 1981).
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extent of that regulation), these analyses must be examined and recondied.
H.

THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE NLRA
AND PROTEST BoycoTTs

In Baldovin v. InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation, the Fifth
Circuit determined that the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA
did not extend to the ILA's activities. According to the court, a union's
political protest of a foreign government's invasion of another nation
does not satisfy the "in commerce" jurisdictional minimum of the
NLRA.9 8 In reaching this result, the Baldovin court concentrated its
analysis upon a line of Supreme Court cases delineating the meaning of
the "in commerce" requirement in the context of NLRA regulation of
foreign flag-of-convenience vessels. 99 Since the Fifth Circuit indicated
that the Supreme Court precedent compelled its decision in
Baldovin," a review of the development of the "in commerce" prerequisite to NLRB jurisdiction is warranted.
A. The "In Commerce" Requirement
The secondary boycott provisions regulate particular union activities directed at individuals employed by a "person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce. . . ."o These provisions
buttress the Act's general limitations to activities "affecting comlabor pracmerce."102 Moreover, the NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair
10 3
tices is also confined to conduct "affecting commerce."
While the scope of the terms "in commerce' and "affecting commerce" is not self-evident, section 2(6) of the Act 4 defines "commerce" to include traffic "between any foreign country and any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia . .. " 105 The legislative history
of the definition likewise evinces a congressional intent to invest the
98 626 F.2d at 454.
99 A "flag-of-convenience" vessel has been defined as a ship of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever reasons, are opportune for the persons who are registering the ships. BoczEK, FLAGS OF
CN VENiENcE 2 (1962). In the first five decades of the twentieth century, the practice of registering national ships under foreign flags had grown to the point where it threatened the survival of
the United States merchant marine. Id at 26-63.
100 626 F.2d at 454.
101 NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
102 Id §§ 153-56, 160 (1976).
103 Id § 160(a) (1976).
104 NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976).
105 Id
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Board with all 6 the power constitutionally delegable under the com10
merce clause.
In light of the literal language of section 2(6), it has never been
doubted that the NLRA applies to the American shipping industry.
Accordingly, as early as 1936 the Board asserted its jurisdiction to order bargaining unit elections among crews on vessels traveling between
the United States and foreign ports in PanamaRailroadCo. 107 In 1940,
the NLRB further extended its jurisdiction over foreign commerce in
American West African Lines, Inc.,10oto include an unfair labor practice proceeding involving an employer engaged in international freight
shipping. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld such
rulings without question.109
Since shipping is an obvious component of the American economy, strikes and boycotts disrupting shipping traffic would appear to
affect commerce pursuant to the analysis of the Board's early case law.
However, when the Supreme Court ultimately ruled on the subject in
1957, its decision reversed the Board's expanding jurisdictional concepts.
B. The Supreme Court and the Flag-of-Convenience Vessel Cases
The first case decided by the Supreme Court on the issue of NLRB
jurisdiction over ships in foreign commerce was Benz v. Compania
NavieraHidalgo.110 It involved a flag-of-convenience ship, owned by a
Panamanian corporation, flying a Liberian flag, and sailing under British articles of agreement. American maritime unions had picketed the
vessel while it was temporarily berthed in the harbor of Portland, Ore106 On its face, the NLRA has a rather broad international scope of subject matter jurisdiction.
Legislative history indicates that NLRB jurisdiction is "based squarely on the power of Congress
... H.R REP. No.
to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations.
969,74th Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9 (1935), reprintedin II NLRB LEGsLATIrvE HISTORY OF THE NLRA,
at 2918 (1935) (statement of Rep. Connery) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIsT. NLRA]. See also
H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935), reprinted in II LEG. HIST. NLRA, at 1964
(statement of Rep. Connery); H.R. REP. No. 1147,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprintedin 1I
LEG. HIST. NLRA, at 3057 (statement of Rep. Connery).
107 2 N.L.R.B. 290 (1936). The NLRB's analysis mirrored the plain language of § 2(6), for the
company, it reasoned, was "directly engaged in commerce between the United States and foreign
countries" and the seamen in question were "directly engaged in such traffic and commerce." Id
at 292.
108 21 N.L.R.B. 691 (1940).
109 The Act has always been held applicable to American-flag ships, notwithstanding the fact
that such vessels operate outside the territorial limits of the United States. See NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949); Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942); NLRB v.

Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
110 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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gon, in support of foreign crew members striking to protest the substandard wages being paid by the owner of the ship. At issue was whether
the NLRA preempted"1 the application of Oregon law in a diversity
action granting damages caused by the union's picketing. The
Supreme Court concluded, after a review of the legislative history of
the Act, that Congress did not intend the Act to regulate labor disputes
between nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign
laws. In determining that federal labor laws were inapplicable, the
Court stated:
The parties point to nothing in the Act itself or its legislative history that
indicates in any way that the Congress intended to bring such disputes
within the coverage of the Act ... [for the NLRA was meant only as] a
bill of rights... for American workingmen and their employers ....
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations, there must be present the affirmative intention of Congress clearly
expressed. 112
Thus, the dual considerations of lack of affirmative congressional
intent and the reluctance to intrude upon foreign affairs matters were
sufficient grounds to place the picketing outside the Act. In the absence
of Board jurisdiction, damages from picketing could be granted under
state law.
The Court reaffirmed the Benz reasoning and afforded jurisdictional content to the "affecting commerce" terminology of the Act some
six years later in the companion cases of McCulloch v. Sociedad de
Marineros de Honduras11 3 and Incres Steamshp Co., Ltd v. InternationalMaritime Workers Union. I" McCulloch involved a challenge to
jurisdiction asserted by the Board over Honduran vessels when the
NLRB attempted to conduct a representation election for alien crews
pursuant to a petition filed by the National Maritime Union, an Ameri111 The doctrine of federal preemption derives from the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
In the context of federal labor law, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over activities that are
potentially subject to regulation under the NLRA. A collary to this concept provides that state
courts may decide labor law disputes in cases where the NLRB does not have jurisdiction. The
current state of the labor law doctrine of federal preemption is best articulated in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, the Court asserted:
If the Board decides ... that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the
matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction. Or the Board may decide
that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether
such activity may be regulated by the States ....
In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities
are subject to state jurisdiction.
Id at 245-46.
112 Id at 142, 144, 147 (emphasis in original).
113 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
114 Id. at 24.
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can labor organization. The vessels were owned by a foreign subsidiary of an American corporation, but their labor relations were
governed by the Honduran labor code.1 15 In holding that the Board

lacked jurisdiction to conduct a representation election, the Court reasoned that it could find nothing in the language or the legislative his-

tory of the NLRA which provided a basis for a construction of the Act
which would allow jurisdiction over the internal management and affairs of a foreign-flag ship." 6 The Court also focused on the need to

avoid "embarrassment in foreign affairs [since] ..... the possibility of
international discord cannot..

.

be gainsaid. ..

.on account of the

concurrent application of the Act and the Honduran Labor Code that
would result with our approval of jurisdiction.""' 7 McCulloch thus
reasserted the Benz rationale that the Act could not be construed to
reach "the internal management and affairs" of foreign-flag ships." 8

Incres was a case brought in New York state court. Liberian flag
carriers sought an injunction against the picketing of their vessels by
the International Maritime Workers Union, an American union
formed for the purpose of organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag

ships." 9 The Court concluded that the picketing was not "in commerce," since the assertion of jurisdiction over the union's activities
would involve the Board in a determination of foreign employer-em-

ployee relationships. Essentially, Incres carried the ouster of NLRB
jurisdiction one step further than McCulloch, establishing that since the
NLRA was without effect, state courts could have jurisdiction over the

dispute. 120
115 Id. at 14.
116 1d at 21.
117 Id at 19.
118 1d at 21.
119 Id. at 25-26.
120 Id at 21. For a discussion of the preemption doctrine, see note 111 supra. When the
Fourth Circuit examined the challenge to the Cuban protest boycott in NLRB v. Local 1355, Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964), the Supreme Court's pronouncements in McCulloch and Incres represented the state of the law regarding Board jurisdiction over foreign-flag ships. Although ultimately denying NLRB jurisdiction on the grounds that
the Act did not apply absent a "labor dispute," id at 995, the Ocean Shpping court decided the
foreign-flag jurisdictional issue in accordance with the Benz-McCulloch-Incres rationale. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned:
[i]t is said that because the [ship at issue) is a foreign-flag vessel manned by an alien crew and
because her owner, Ocean, seeks to invoke the Board's aid, this controversy is not one "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Act. InMcCulloch. . . Incres... and Benz....
the cases relied upon for this purpose by the ILA, the Supreme Court declared the Board
without jurisdiction over labor relations between owners of foreign-flag vessels and their
crews. These cases all relate to shipboardlabor relations something very d erentfrom the
present case.
d (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Board and the district court issuing a § 10(1) injunc-
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The Benz-McCulloch-Incres trilogy involved attempts by American unions to represent alien crew members aboard foreign vessels.
Sometime later, however, American unions picketed foreign flag-ofconvenience ships to call attention to the competitive advantage enjoyed by those vessels due to wage differences between foreign and domestic maritime workers.' 2 1 In International Longshoremen's
Association Local 1316 v. Ariadne Shipping Co. ,122 the Supreme Court
considered whether the NLRB had jurisdiction over picketing of foreign ships in Florida ports to protest "substandard wages paid by foreign-flag vessels to American longshoremen working in American
ports."'123 The dispute involved a ship of Liberian registry, owned by a
Liberian corporation, which had employed American longshoremen, as
well as part of its foreign crew, to perform longshore operations. Although the foreign shipowners successfully enjoined the picketing in
state courts, the Court determined that the Board possessed jurisdiction, and thus preempted application of state law.
In reaching its conclusion, the Ariadne Court distinguished the
Benz-McCulloch-Incres rationale. While Benz and McCulloch involved situations where NLRB jurisdiction "would necessitate inquiry
into the 'internal discipline and order' of a foreign vessel,"' 12 4 the Court
observed no need to bar the Board from jurisdiction in the present controversy:
The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not
obscure the fact that this dispute centered on wages to be paid American
residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is no evition against the boycott also found jurisdiction and distinguished Benz, McCulloch, and Incres.
Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd. (Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n), 146 N.L.R.B. 723, 727
(1964); Penello v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F. Supp. 161, 169 (D. Md. 1964).

As the Board reasoned, "[since] the instant proceeding involves no issue bearing upon labor relations aboard the Tulse Hill, its registry and the composition of the vessel's crew are immaterial in

determining the Board's power to entertain Ocean's unfair labor practice charges.....

146

N.L.R.B. at 727 n.3.

121 For a description of the history of labor union opposition to flag-of-convenience vessels on
account of their adverse effect on maritime employment opportunities, see BoczEK, supra note 99,
at 64-90. Labor opposition culminated in a 1971 strike against all flag-of-convenience ships by the
ILA and ILWU which closed virtually all American ports to such vessels. See Comment, Foreign
Sh#os in American Ports: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction, 9 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 50, 53-54
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ForeignShos].
122 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
123 Id at 196.

124 Id at 198. It was this intervention which would be likely to "raise considerable disturbance, not only in the field of maritime law, but in our international relations as well." Id,
quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
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internal affairs
dence that these occasional workers were involved in any
12 5
of either ship which would be governed by foreign law.
Thus, foreign flag vessels could be picketed where the possibility of
1 26
conflict with foreign law was absent.
The line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Benz and culminating inAriadne recognized that federal labor law would be applied
to foreign-flag vessels where the underlying dispute centered on longshore operations involving American maritime workers, and not the
controversies of foreign shipowners and their foreign workingmen.
However, in 1974, two major Supreme Court decisions dramatically
changed the scheme of labor law jurisdiction over foreign ships. Windward Shioping (London) Ltd v. American Radio Association 27 and
American Radio Association v. Mobile SteamshiO Association" 8 arose
out of multi-union picketing in protest of the competition for work opportunities presented by flag-of-convenience vessels. 129 Windward
Shiping resulted from an injunction entered by a Texas state court on
behalf of a foreign shipowner restraining the ILA from picketing foreign vessels. In Mobile Steamshiv, American stevedoring companies
sought injunctions from an Alabama state court to enjoin the same conduct. The Supreme Court held in both cases that the picketing was not
"in commerce" within the meaning of the Act, and therefore not preempted by federal labor law.
The Court in Windward Shipping observed that the picketing did
not "involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of foreign ships
that was present in Benz and Incres."13 0 Nevertheless, the Court declined to recognize NLRB jurisdiction despite the fact that no possible
conflict existed with respect to the internal affairs of the foreign vessels.
In articulating a new jurisdictional test, the Court determined that
the purpose of the picketing was to "exert sufficient pressure so that
foreign vessels would be forced to raise their operating costs to levels
As a consequence,
comparable to those of American shippers."''
commerce essential to the United States might be interrupted if foreign
shipowners choose to boycott American ports to avoid the difficulties
125 397 U.S. at 199.
126 Compare International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1316 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397
U.S. 195, 200 (1970) (NLRB has jurisdiction since its assertion would not be "likely to lead to
conflict with foreign or international law") with Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138,
142 (1957) (the Board lacks jurisdiction over "a foreign employer and a foreign crew operating
under an agreement made abroad under the laws of another nation").
127 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
128 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
129 See note 121 supra.
130 415 U.S. at 114.
131 Id
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caused by the picketing. Further, retaliatory action against American
vessels in foreign ports might result if the NLRA were applied to foreign vessels. Thus, the accomplishment of the union's picketing would
result in "more than a negligible impact" on the overall costs of the
foreign ships' operations. 132 For this reason:
[u]nlikeAriadne, the protest here could not be accommodated by a wage
decision on the part of the shipowners which would affect only wages
Virtually none of the predictable repaid within this country ....
sponses of a foreign shipowner to picketing of this type, therefore, would
be limited to the sort of wage-cost decision benefitting American workto regulate. This case, therefore, falls
ingmen which the Act was designed
133
under Benz rather than Ariadne.
Under this rationale, the Board lacked jurisdiction over picketing
which could affect the economic interests of foreign ships.
The Mobile Steamshp plaintiffs sought to enjoin the same picketing involved in Windward Shiping. However, the state court plaintiffs
were not the foreign shipowners of the picketed ships, as in Windward
Shipping, but were instead the stevedoring companies which serviced
the vessels and shippers who wished to have their crops loaded for carriage. The change in disputants did not alter the Court's analysis. The
Court held that, where the primary dispute between the union and the
foreign shipowners is beyond the Board's statutory authority, the effect
of the picketing of the foreign vessels on the businesses of domestic
stevedoring companies provides no foundation for coverage under the
NLRA.134 A bifurcated view of the term "commerce" to extend its
reach to American businesses affected by the primary dispute would
not be sanctioned; the Board's jurisdiction as to the incidental effects on
American stevedoring companies would depend upon whether the Act
135
extended to the primary dispute.
The Windward Shipping-Mobile Steamshi jurisdictional test,
132 Id

Id at 114-15. The dissent of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall,
took strong exception to the majority's analysis. Id at 116-24. Justice Brennan criticized the
Court for its failure to adequately rationalize and distinguish the Benz-riadne line of cases. Id
at 116-17. These cases had held that Congress did not intend to grant the NLRB jurisdiction if,
but only if, it would involve Board inquiry into the labor relations between foreign crews and
foreign owners. Id at 119-22. Moreover, the dissent could find no support for the rationale focusing upon the economic effects of the union's picketing. Id at 118. NLRB cognizance of the union
activity in Wndward would not, claimed Justice Brennan, result in Board inquiry into the internal
affairs of foreign vessels. Id at 122.
134 419 U.S. at 219.
135 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented for the reason that the case should be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB in view of Ariadne. Id at 234.
According to the dissent's reasoning, the picketing constituted a secondary dispute between the
union and a domestic stevedoring company. Id at 237.
133
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which focuses upon the possible economic ramifications of union picketing, would have been irrelevant under the analysis of the Benz-McCulloch-Incres trilogy. The result, a dramatic departure from the
former rationale, posits a sweeping test which places any union conduct
affecting the economic interests of foreign-flag ships beyond the jurisdiction of the Board. More importantly, the Mobile Steamshp holding
removes NLRA protection for neutral, domestic employers suffering
from the adverse effects of the union activity.
C. Baldovin: The Russian Trade Boycott in the Fifth Circuit
The Baldovin court analyzed whether the ILA's protest boycott
met the "affecting commerce" jurisdictional minimum with reference to
the Supreme Court's flag-of-convenience vessel cases. The Fifth Circuit asserted that these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
interpreted the commerce requirement of the secondary boycott provisions to advance two separate purposes:
[First,] they set forth the basis for congressional action and the limitation
on that action in accordance with congressional concepts traditionally incorporated by those terms, [and secondj they limit the statutory scope of
the secondary boycott36provisions to those boycotts that could be remedied
by domestic action.
In light of these dual purposes, the Baldovin court examined the reach
of the NLRA under the Windward Shipping "economic effects" test.
In writing for the panel, Judge Rubin reasoned that "the object of
a dispute determines whether or not it is 'in commerce.' ",137 In the
instant case, the ILA's objective "is to voice a political protest against
13
the U.S.S.R. by refusing to handle cargo bound for that country." 1
For this reason, the union's activities were even further removed from
the type of conduct to which the NLRA had already been held not to
apply in Windward Shpping:
When the dispute is over the hiring of American labor in United States
ports, it is "in commerce." [Ariadne.] When the dispute is over the foreign vessels' relations with its foreign employees, it is not "in commerce."
[Windward Shipping.] When the dispute is over a foreign government's
136 626 F.2d at 450.
137 Id at 453.
138 Id at 452. In so characterizing the object of the union's picketing, the court rejected the
Board's contention that "whatever the ultimate object of the ILA's boycott may be, 'an object' of

the boycott is to force or require the stevedores to cease doing business" with the U.S.S.R. in
violation of §8(b)(4). Id This would seem to imply that if the ILA had a dispute with neutral

domestic companies doing business with the Soviet Union, an object of the boycott would be "in
commerce" within the meaning of Windward Shipping. See text accompanying notes 130-33
supra.
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invasion of a remote nation, it is emphatically not "in commerce."

139

The Fifth Circuit's focus upon the union's object diverted the
court's consideration from the factual premise upon which the Supreme
Court based its interpretation of the NLRA in Benz, McCulloch, Incres,
Ariadne, and Windward Shioping. With the exception of McCulloch

(which involved the Board's attempt to conduct a representation election for the crew of aforeign-flag vessel), each of these cases involved
union picketing of foreign-flag vessels. Accordingly, the question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Act affirmatively protected or prohibited union activity directed at working conditions
aboard foreign-flag ships. Had the ILA's Russian trade boycott affected the servicing of an American ship, however, the concerns which

prompted the restriction of NLRB jurisdiction of foreign-flag vessels in
the Benz- Windward Shaping cases would not be implicated. 140 Yet in
Baldovin, Judge Rubin neither identified the registry of the vessels boycotted in the Texas and Georgia ports nor implied that the issue even
figured in his analysis. 14 1 The extension of the Windward Shipping
analysis by the Fifth Circuit without such discussion is unwarranted. 142
139 Id at 453 (citations added).
140 See, ,,g.,
Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1371 (1st
Cir. 1981); Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 529 (D. Mass. 1980);
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied Int'l, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108
L.R.R.M. 1033, 1035 (Aug. 28, 1981). For a discussion of the rationale of the First Circuit and the
Board regarding jurisdiction over the ILA's protest boycott, see notes 236-39 Infra. Moreover,
where American ships are involved, the NLRB has always asserted jurisdiction. See cases cited in
notes 107-08 supra. Likewise, long standing Supreme Court precedent supports such an interpretation of the Act. See note 109 supra. The Board reaffirmed this rationale most recently in Alcoa
Marine Corp. (Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots), 240 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1979). In this case, the
Board exercised jurisdiction over a United States flag ship performing offshore drilling under
contract to the Brazilian government. Jurisdiction was found despite the vessel's "permanent stay
outside United States territorial waters." Id
141 In the case on appeal from the Southern District of Texas, the ILA refused to load grain
bound for Russia aboard the Belgium, a bulk carrier of Belgian registry. [1980] 24 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at A-I 1.In Mack, an appeal from the Southern District of Georgia, the opinion does
not discuss the registries of the boycotted vessels. However, in the consolidated unfair labor practice proceeding, the opinion of the administrative law judge indicated that the ships boycotted in
the ports of Savannah and Brunswick were of foreign registry. See International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Local 799, (Allied Int'l, Inc.), Case No. 1-CC-1753, slip op. at 3 n.9 (Mar. 16, 1981). In any
event, the lower courts and the Fifth Circuit neither identified the vessels and their respective
registries, nor factored such a consideration into their analyses.
142 The Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Black's denial of an injunction in the § 10(1) proceeding
filed in the Southern District of Texas. 626 F.2d at 454. In this particular proceeding, the NLRB's
regional director sought a nation-wide injunction of the Russian trade boycott. [1980] 22 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-12. In affirming the denial of the injunction on solely jurisdictional
grounds, the Fifth Circuit presumably intended its jurisdictional decision to apply to all ILA activities, not just those specific instances of union conduct directed at foreign ships. Otherwise, the
Baldovin court would have issued an injunction exempting ILA action concerning United States

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3:211(1981)

The Baldovin court declared that the Russian trade boycott did not
come within the coverage of the Act for the additional reason that
"only a political decision on the part of a foreign government can satisfy the ILA's grievance."' 4 3 This analysis mirrors the inquiry undertaken by the Supreme Court in Windward Shioping in determining
whether the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to picketing
"would be limited to the sort of wage-cost decision benefitting American workingmen which the Act was designed to regulate." 1" There,
the Supreme Court determined that because the accomplishment of the
union's aim would impact upon the foreign shipowner's operations beyond United States borders, the Board did not have jurisdiction over
the picketing. Hence, the Baldovin court reasoned that because the
"Soviet government.

. .

is the only authority capable of responding to

the ILA protest," a hypothetical response by that government would
constitute an intolerable intrusion into the affairs of a foreign sovereign. 145 Since a Soviet reaction to eliminate the cause of the boycott
would necessarily affect its own internal interests, the economic effects
test of Windward Shiping therefore "compels a finding that the ILA
activities do not come within the coverage of the Act."'146
To support his broad reading of the economic effects test, Judge
Rubin cited an earlier decision of the Board in National Maritime
Union (Shipper's Stevedoring Co.).
In this case, the Board upheld
the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) that picketing by an
American union of a Soviet vessel to protest the ship's carrying of cargo
financed by United States government contracts was not an unfair labor practice. 148 Although the question was not decided, the ALJ's decision implied that jurisdiction did not exist on account of "the degree of
intrusion into the affairs of the foreign entity which will be brought
about by that entities [sic] response to the union's activities."149 Thus,
according to the Fifth Circuit, Windward Shipping, coupled with Shipships. The Fifth Circuit's decision therefore eliminates Board jurisdiction over the ILA's boycott
with regard to Russian cargoes, including cargoes carried on American ships. It would appear
that the extension of the H7ndwardShioping analysis to situations wherein American vessels are
involved is contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions. See notes 107-09, 140 supra. Such a result
warrants a rationale for distinguishing between American and foreign vessels. The Baldovin court
provided none.
143 626 F.2d at 453-54.
144 Id at 451, quoting Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S.

104, 115 (1974).
145 Id at 454.
146 Id

147 245 N.L.R.B. 149 (1979).
148 Id at 150, 161.
149 Id at 162.
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pe' Stevedoring, foreclosed NLRB jurisdiction over the Russian trade

boycott.
A scrutiny of the AL's opinion, however, reveals that the Fifth
Circuit placed undue reliance upon the construction of the Windward
Shpping test advanced in Shpper's Stevedoring. First, the order issued
by the ALJ,and approved by the Board, was based upon a finding that
no violation of the Act had occurred. 15° The focus upon the degree of
intrusion into the affairs of a foreign country as a guide for determining
NLRB jurisdiction is therefore dicta. Second, the extension of the
Windward Shipping rationale to the factual situation in Shpper's Stevedoing appears questionable. The objectives of the picketing in Windward Shpping were to pressure the foreign shipowners to raise their
operating costs to levels comparable to American shippers. In short,
the picketing constituted an attempt to interfere with the internal affairs
of a foreign vessel. Yet, in Shpper's Stevedoring, the union sought enforcement of American cargo preference laws by the United States government.' 5 ' The accomplishment of the union's objective did not
require action by a foreign government. The ALl's focus upon the in150 Id at 161. Courts have also viewed the order in Shpper'r Stevedoring to be based on a
finding that no violation of the Act had occurred. Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
630 F.2d 864 n.12 (Ist Cir. 1980).
1s1 The cargo preference laws require that 50% of all government financed cargoes be carried
on American vessels. Act of Aug. 26, 1954, ch. 936, 68 Stat. 832 (1954) (codified at 46 U.S.C.
§ 1241 (1976)). When shipments to the Soviet Union have been involved, enforcement of these
laws has been a constant source of conflict between the ILA and the government over the past two
decades. Longshoremen opposed President Kennedy's sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in 1963,
but agreed to lift their subsequent boycott of Russian ships in return for the administration's
pledge that 50% of the grain would be carried in American bottoms. See Bilder, East-West Trade
Boycotts: 4 Study inPyrivate, Labor Union, State, and Local Interferencewith ForeignPolicy, 118
U. PA. L. REv.841, 873-78 (1970). Waivers of the 50% requirement precipitated additional boycotts of grain shipments destined for the U.S.S.R. during the Johnson administration. ALDERKARLssoN, supra note 50, at 107; N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1964, at 1, col 5. Maritime unions also
opposed further grain sales to Soviet-bloc countries. See Shiping Restrictionson Grain Sales to
EasternEurope, HearingsBefore the Se,% Comm on For.Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-79
(1965) (statement ofJohn Condon, ILA spokesman). Although the government explored the possibility of bringing secondary boycott charges against the ILA, complaints were not filed after
lawyers advising the Johnson administration concluded that the protest boycott did not contravene § 8(b)(4). See Bus. WEEI, Feb. 29,1964, at 24.
Boycotts were reinstituted during the administration of President Ford to protest renewed
grain sales to Russia. Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1975, at 20, col 2; id, Aug. 11, 1975, at 2, col. 2. One
court enjoined the boycott in Texas ports on account of an ILA local's breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F.
Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), atd, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976). Secondary boycott charges were
also filed against other locals by neutral parties unable to ship wheat harvests to the Soviet Union.
[1975] 183 DAILY LAB.REP. (BNA) at A-17. However, the parties settled their dispute before the
case reached the Board. See Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445, 448
n.2 (5th Cir. 1980).
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trusion into the affairs of a foreign country brought about by that sovereign's response to the union's activities is thus misplaced in light of
the factual situation in Shipper'sStevedoring. Finally, for the same reason, the Fifth Circuit's analogy of the Russian trade boycott to the situation in Shipper's Stevedoring is incorrect. Shipper's Stevedoring
involved a protest boycott directed against the American government,
whereas Baldovin concerned union activity focusing upon a foreign
government.
The final prong of analysis followed by the Baldovin court in
reaching its conclusion rested upon the reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mobile Steamship. Judge Rubin recognized that the
ILA's boycott had an incidental effect on American farmers who produce grain, transportation companies which move the products to port,
and American stevedore firms which load it aboard vessels. 52 In the
court's view, however, the economic repercussions caused by the boycott were an incidental effect of the union's activity and not its objective. Invoking the rationale of Mobile Steamship, the Fifth Circuit held
that a bifurcated view of the "affecting commerce" requirement is not
permitted in order to protect the domestic businesses adversely affected
by the ILA's politically-inspired work stoppage. Therefore, the effect
of the union's conduct on the businesses of American entities provides
no "basis for Board jurisdiction
where the primary dispute is beyond its
1 53
authority."
statutory
The Fifth Circuit's utilization of the Mobile Steamship rationale
demonstrates the dangerous extreme to which the Supreme Court's
Windward Shpping-Mobile Steamshi rationale can logically be carried. Essentially, on account of the potential foreign effects of union
conduct, the result in Baldovin vests the regulation of protest boycotts
in the states rather than the NLRB. 154 This result unduly restricts
NLRB jurisdiction over labor union conduct affecting the foreign com152 626 F.2d at 453. Specifically, members of the American Farm Bureau Federation and the
Texas and Kansas State Farm Bureaus alleged that the protest boycott prevented the loading of
their members' grain shipments under terms of a five year trade agreement between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union. [1980] 17 DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3.
153 626 F.2d at 452-53, quoting American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S.
215, 226 (1974) (emphasis in original).
154 Upon the determination that a protest boycott is directed at foreign entities, the Baldovin
rationale automatically removes the federal preemption bar. See note 111 supra. At the trial
hearing stage, this same reasoning led to the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges resulting
from the Russian trade boycott. In International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799, (Allied Int'l,
Inc.), Case No. I-CC-1753 (Mar. 16, 1981), an administrative law judge dismissed three complaints filed against the union on the ground that the ILA's work stoppage was beyond the Board's
jurisdiction. According to the ALU, "[ulnion conduct which is intended to disrupt foreign commerce and its instrumentalities, and which has the real capability of disrupting such commerce
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merce of the United States, and represents an unwarranted departure
from the goals of federal labor legislation and the evils those laws
sought to redress.
D. The Validity of the Windward Shipping-Mobile Steamshiq Test
as Applied to Protest Boycotts
Contrary to the fears expressed in WindwardShipping and Mobile
Steamship, and echoed in Baldovin, NLRB jurisdiction over protest
boycotts would not constitute an intolerable intrusion into the affairs of
a foreign nation. While the ILA's work stoppage was motivated by the
dispute between the union and the U.S.S.R. over the latter's military
policy, the application of section 8(b)(4) to the union's activities would
not imply jurisdiction over Soviet military policy. Rather, jurisdiction
over the Russian trade boycott would advance the policies underlying
federal labor legislation while nonetheless maintaining due regard for
foreign interests.
In allowing neutral, domestic businesses to invoke the Act to
counter protest boycotts, NLRB jurisdiction over the secondary aspects
of union conduct would not result in the extraterritorial extension of
United States labor laws.155 The application of the NLRA to the situation in Baldovin would portend no interference in the management or
affairs of foreign governments, companies or workers. Instead, the Act
would regulate the union's power to exert economic pressure upon
American firms doing business with foreign countries.1 56 Finally, a
successful injunction against the protest boycott would prevent "an embarrassment in foreign affairs," an objective which the Supreme Court
... is not within the reach of the Board's jurisdiction, but rather is exclusively subject to state
laws.' Id slip op. at 5.
155 In comparison to a union's attempt to organize the alien crew of a foreign vessel, application of the NLRA to protest boycotts would not represent an intrusion into the affairs of a foreign
sovereign. See Foreign Shos, supra note 121, at 69-70.
Curiously, while the Fifth Circuit would restrict Board jurisdiction in .Baldovin on account of
the potential for international discord, the very same panel of circuit judges enforced injunctions

issued by arbitrators who had adjudicated ILA actions as violations of no-strike obligations in
collective bargaining agreemenata

See New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore

Workers ILA Local Union No. 1418,486 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La.), a 7'd in part, 626 F.2d 455 (5th
Cir. 1980). How injunctions enforcing arbitration decisions are any less intrusive of foreign interests than the requested § 10(1) injunctions denied in Baldovin escapes reasoned analysis.

156 What is at stake is whether an American firm is entitled to be shielded by § 8(b)(4) from
union conduct occurring in this country, and directly affecting its domestic business. One commentator has suggested that where jurisdiction hinges upon a balance between international comity and the legitimate interests of domestic entities, the policy of respect for foreign governments
should not take precedence over a domestic interest. See Foreign Ships,supra note 121, at 73 & 73
n.114.
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has deemed important in construing the reach of the Act when foreign
interests are implicated."5 7
The pillar upon which the Supreme Court supported its interpretation of the NLRA in the flag-of-convenience vessel cases was the absence of a congressional intent to apply the Act to foreign ships.
Understandably, the Baldovin court likewise declined to analyze the
jurisdictional question with reference to the policies of the NLRA. Yet,
an attempt to effectuate the purposes of the Act should not be abanto
doned because the legislative history reveals no evidence of attention
58
the specific problem of foreign-flag ships or protest boycotts.1
An examination of the purposes of federal labor legislation yields
the conclusion that NLRB jurisdiction over protest boycotts would further the underlying policies of the NLRA. The goals of the Act are
generally recognized as the amelioration of the situation of workingmen, the avoidance of disorder and injury caused by strikes and the
improvement of the economic health of the nation.15 9 In restricting
Board jurisdiction over protest boycotts, the absence of federal regulation leads to a disruptive effect on American industrial peace and the
national economy. Since American longshoremen are an obvious part
of our domestic economy and labor force, and boycotts in United
States ports quite plainly obstruct the free flow of commerce, the long157 See MeCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963).
158 Although there is some evidence suggesting that in 1939 the ILA refused to load shipments
of scrap iron bound for Japan on account of the impending conflict between the American and
Japanese governments, see ShippingRestrictionson GrainSales to EasternEurope: HearingsBefore
the Sen. Comm on For.Relations, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 174 (1965), it would appear that Congress
never considered the issue of jurisdiction over protest boycotts in passing the LMRA and the
LMRDA. Inasmuch as Congress never envisioned a situation involving a union's tactical use of a
boycott against a foreign government, the issue concerning the application of the Act should turn
on whether congressional intent may be inferred. Commentators have argued that a proper jurisdictional test should therefore focus on whether the interests which the NLRA seeks to promote
would be furthered by applying the Act to union activities which impact upon foreign interests.
See Nothstein and Ayres, The MultinationalCorporationand the ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Labor Management RelationsAct, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 40 (1976).
159 As provided by the introductory section of the Taft-Hartley Act:
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce.. . jeopardize[s] the
public health, safety, [and] interest. It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and
promote
flow
of commerce,
employersthe
in full
their
relations
affectingtocommerce,
to provide orderly and peaceful procedures
for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the
rights commerce,
of individual
their relations with labor organizations whose activities
affect
to employees
define and in
proscribe
practices on the part of labor and management
public
in connection
disputestoaffecting
commerce.
commercewith
andlabor
are inimical
the general
welfare, and to protect the rights of the
which affect
LRMA § I, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of the factors which led to the
passage of the
tNLRA, LRMA, and LMRDA, see KORETZ, STATtoRY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
StATES: LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 259-348, 548-672, 682-784 (1970).
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shore industry is clearly within the purpose and scope of the NLRA.
Moreover, maritime workers engaged in loading operations in American ports are a legitimate object of congressional concern in view of
their role in transporting cargoes in the foreign commerce of the United
States. Finally, the specific purpose of the secondary boycott provisions, namely, to protect neutral businesses from disputes to which they
are not a party, is effectuated by application of section 8(b)(4) to protest
boycotts.
Another consideration in evaluating any limitation upon Board jurisdiction is the interest in labor law uniformity. It is undisputed that
in the interests of equality of treatment and predictability, labor law
questions should be treated by means of a uniform national system of
law. 6' Taken together, the decisions in Baldovin, Windward Shipping,
and Mobile Steamship direct American business entities to the state
courts to seek remedies against protest boycotts. Implicit in Windward
Shipping and Mobile Steamshp is the judgement that labor law uniformity is promoted by state court resolution of these matters, since
they are more likely than the NLRB to enjoin picketing of foreign vessels by American maritime unions.1 61 However, in the context of protest boycotts, the validity of this judgment remains open to question.
It is settled that peaceful picketing, without more, is lawful and
cannot be enjoined.1 62 The collateral consequences of such activity,
however, may be regulated, and in doing so, a state may constitutionally enjoin picketing to effectuate some public policy.1 63 Foreign shipowners therefore have been successful in obtaining state court
injunctions against maritime union picketing on the grounds that the
picketing interfered with the business affairs of the vessel and disturbed
existing contractual relationships.' 64 Because a refusal to handle spe160 The desire for national labor law uniformity was one of the major factors prompting the

creation of the NLRB. See MoRRIS, supra note 7, at 27. The preemption doctrine, discussed at
note 111, is a prominent illustration of the uniformity principle in operation.
161 Foreign shipowners generally have been successful in obtaining injunctions in state courts
against union picketing. See, eg., Fruit Dispatch Co. v. National Maritime Union of America,
138 So.2d 853 (La. CL App. 1962); Ryan v. Hirsch, 174 Ohio St. 461, 190 N.E.2d 262 (1963); State
ex rel. Seafarer's Int'l Union of North America v. Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, 174
Ohio St. 466, 190 N.E.2d 263 (1963); Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of
Canada, 18 Wis.2d 646, 119 N.W.2d 426 (1963); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416,
AFL-CIO v. Eastern S.S. Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1968); American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO
v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 291 Ala. 201, 279 So.2d 467 (1973), aJ'd,419 U.S. 215 (1974).
162 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
163 Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
164 See note 161 supra But see Marlindo Campania Naviera S/A v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of
North America, 47 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 18,252 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
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cific goods does not involve the coercive aspects of a picket line, protest
boycotts present different legal issues from those found in the analysis
of picketing. Accordingly, the extent to which peaceful boycott activity
may be enjoined will be resolved in light of the varying substantive and
procedural laws of the fifty states. Furthermore, a majority of states
bar the issuance of state court injunctions in labor disputes through
anti-injunction statutes. 165 Thus, to place within a framework of state
labor law regulation the determination of the legality of protest boycotts, typically conducted by local unions on a multi-state basis, is to
create the inevitability of a confused pattern of conflicting decisions.
The Baldovin approach therefore increases the possibility of international discord by giving state courts unequivocal jurisdiction over
protest boycotts. This result presents the anomoly that state courts may
plunge into the field of international relations, while the NLRB, because it is international relations, is precluded from acting. Moreover,
regulation of an activity of national concern is subject to disparate state
laws reflecting parochial interests. The risk of state court adjudication
fracturing foreign relations is thereby augmented. In this situation, the
need for a uniform national policy is unusually compelling. The Board
is the uniquely suited to this task as the administrative body empowered to enforce the federal policies embodied in the NLRA. Thus,
NLRB jurisdiction over protest boycotts would eliminate the potential
for conflicting state court decisions while providing a uniform rule of
national scope applicable to multi-state protest boycotts.
In a time when many national economies are international in impact, and when the labor relations of a domestic enterprise may have a
substantial bearing upon the conduct of foreign trade, the Windward
Shipping-Mobile Steamsh# jurisdictional concept is shortsighted. Accordingly, this Comment will now undertake an examination of the jurisdictional reach of the NLRA over protest boycotts in light of the
underlying policies of federal labor legislation. In the following discussion, a theory positing that the Act's secondary boycott provisions encompass and forbid all protest boycotts will be presented. The theory
will also be compared to the analyses of the First Circuit inAlliedInternational,Inc. v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association, 166 and the
Board in InternationalLongshoremen's Association, Local 799 (Allied
165 Thirty-four states have enacted "baby Norris-LaGuardia Acts" which bar state court in-

junctions in labor disputes. See I CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAWS

40,356 (1976). In such

jurisdictions, labor activity outside the jurisdiction of the NLRA is not enjoinable under state tort
law. Regardless of whether state courts decide that their anti-injunction statutes cover protest
boycotts, the interpretation of state law will be made with no possibility of federal review.
166 640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1981).
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International,Inc.),167 two cases holding that section 8(b)(4) was applicable to the ILA's boycott of American vessels carrying Russian cargoes.
III.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION

8(B)(4) To

PROTEST

BOYCOTTS

In the Russian trade boycott cases, several parties advanced a theory which reasoned that the ILA violated section 8(b)(4) through its
application of coercive pressure upon stevedoring companies with an
object of inducing them to cease doing business with firms trading with
the Soviet Union. 68 Sixteen years earlier, a similar theory convinced
the Board in Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd (Local 1355, International
Longshoremen'sAssociation) that the ILA's boycott of vessels engaged
in Cuban trade violated the NLRA. 16 9 However, this theory appears to
be unfaithful to the reality of circumstances of the Russian trade boycott.
The ILA's policy of refusing to work ships which had engaged in
trade with Cuba stemmed from a "clearly defined policy to eliminate
trade with Cuba."'' 70 Pursuant to this policy, the union sought to punish shipowners who had engaged in trade with Cuba by forcing neutral
companies to cease rendering services to them. Yet, in the Russian
trade boycott, the ILA framed its dispute as exclusively with the
U.S.S.R., and not with firms doing business with the Russians. Thus,
any theory upon which a violation of the secondary boycott provisions
is premised must consider the political nature of protest boycotts.
A theory which more clearly takes account of the facts underlying
the Russian trade boycott, and protest boycotts in general, recognizes
that the primary disputants are the union and the foreign government
under union censure. American entities maintaining business relationships with the foreign countries are neutrals, for the union does not
seek to affect the labor relations of domestic employers. In implementing its boycott, the union endeavors to utilize the resulting disruption of
business relations between American firms and the foreign country as a
medium for expressing the union's disapproval of the foreign government. Moreover, the cessation of business becomes a sword by which
the union inflicts economic carnage upon the foreign government to
167 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. 1033 (Aug. 28, 1981).
168 See, eg., Brief of Occidental Chemical Company at 5, Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).

169 See 146 N.L.R.B. 723 (1964).

170 Id at 726. For a discussion of the motives underlying the Cuban trade boycott, see notes
50-63 supra.
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force a change or reassessment of its objectionable policies. Thus, as
the union has forced neutral employers to cease doing business with the
primary target of the union's protest, the protest boycott violates section 8(b)(4).
The protest boycott theory must confront several jurisdictional
thresholds before section 8(b)(4) can be measured against union conduct. First, whether the secondary boycott provisions apply absent the
existence of a "labor dispute;" second, whether a foreign government
qualifies as a "person" under section 8(b)(4) so as to make the Act's
prohibitions applicable to a protest boycott; and third, whether the primary dispute between the union and foreign government must be "in
commerce" for the Board to assert jurisdiction over the secondary aspects of the union's conduct. Following an analysis of these jurisdictional hurdles, examination will focus on whether a protest boycott
constitutes an unfair labor practice. Although the theory discussed below will be applied to the Russian trade boycott, it is assumed that the
theory is equally applicable to all protest boycotts.
A. The Requirement of a "Labor Dispute"
A characteristic of any protest boycott is that the primary dispute
between the union and foreign government is not a traditional labor
dispute.171 Accordingly, the protest boycott theory must confront the
argument that the statutory ban on secondary boycotts does not apply
absent a primary labor dispute to which the challanged union conduct
can be secondary.
The ILA asserted this contention in section 10(1) proceedings in
the form of a jurisdictional argument that the Board has no authority to
resolve controversies that do not involve a "labor dispute" as defined in
section 2(9) of the Act. 172 The primary authority representing the view
that section 2(9) creates a jurisdictional barrier is NLRB v. Local 1355,
InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation (Ocean Shofping). 173 In this
case, the Fourth Circuit construed the NLRA to require the existence
See note 4 supra. As the First Circuit observed of the Russian trade boycott, "It]here is no
dispute between the ILA and Russia over matters traditionally thought to be the subject of union
171

concern." Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1981). Likewise, the Board asserted that "this case presents a dispute between the ILA and
[, for the union] concede[s] ... a primary objective to pressure the Soviet govthe USSR ....

ernment to halt its aggression against Afghanistan." International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
799 (Allied Int'l, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1035 (Aug. 28, 1981).
172 See, e.g., Brief of ILA at 14-26, Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1980).
173 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
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of a labor dispute as a condition of the Board's jurisdiction.'74 The
Ocean Shipping court garnered support for its position on two grounds:
(1) that the term "labor dispute" as defined in section 2(9) is found

throughout the Act, 175 and (2) that the Supreme Court has stated that

to regulate the conduct of people engaged in
the NLRA was "designed
176
labor disputes."'
The jurisdictional argument accepted in Ocean Shipping has been
178
and commentators. 1 79
soundly rejected by the Board, 177 courts,
Likewise, both the Mack and Allied International decisions, and the
opinion of the Board in InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation, Local 799, repudiated the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in the context of the
Russian trade boycott.18 0 Section 2(9) is more properly viewed as a
definitional provision utilized to ensure uniform meaning to the phrase
"labor dispute" as it appears in different contexts throughout the statute.'" Certainly the frequency of the use of the phrase "labor dispute"
174 Id at 995-96.
175 Id at 995, citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(9).
176 Id, citing Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960).
177 In considering Ocean Shipping's labor dispute requirement, the Board stated that "until
such time as the issue is finally resolved by the Supreme Court, [it would adhere] to the view that
its power to prevent unfair labor practices is not so qualified." National Maritime Union
(Weyerhauser Lines), 147 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1317 n.3 (1964). The Board has continually reaffirmed
this position. Local 16, Int'l Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union (City of Juneau), 176
N.L.R.B. 889, 893 (1969); Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council (Red Wing Wood Products, Inc.),
167 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1023 (1967); National Maritime Union (Delta Steamship Lines), 147 N.L.R.B.
1328, 1331 (1964); National Maritime Union (Houston Maritime Ass'n), 147 N.L.R.B. 1243, 124647 (1964).
178 The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the
Eighth Circuit have rejected the proposition that the definition of a labor dispute in § 2(9) was
intended by Congress to limit the Board's jurisdiction. Teamsters, Local 812 v. NLRB, 105
L.R.R.M. 2659, 2662 (D.C. Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F.2d
309, 312-13 (8th Cir. 1970); National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB (Delta Steamship
Lines), 346 F.2d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union
of America v. NLRB (Weyerhauser Lines), 342 F.2d 538, 542-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
835 (1965). Accord Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of North America,
348 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (W.D. Wis. 1971). But see cases ited at note 7 supra.
179 CaseNote, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV.752,754-55 (1966); Comments on Recent Cases, 50
IOWA L. REv.946, 952 (1965); Comments, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1317, 1318 (1965); Recent Decions,
51 VA. L. REv.157, 161 (1965); Notes, 11 WAYNE L. REV.580, 581-85 (1965); Recent Cases, 78
HARv.L. REV.463, 464-65 (1964). But see authorities cited in note 7 supra.
180 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378-79 (1st Cir.
1981); Mack v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 104 L.R.R.M. 2892, 2894 (S.D. Ga. 1980);
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied Int'l, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108
L.R.R.M. 1033, 1036 & 1036 n.15, 1039-40 (Aug. 28, 1981).
181 The term is used three times in the definitional section. See NLRA § 2(3),(5),(7), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3),(5),(7) (1976). It should also be noted that "labor dispute" is linked with jurisdiction in
two other sections of the Act. In both sections, however, the term is employed in a negative
jurisdictional manner which does not limit the Board's jurisdiction. See NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C.

253
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in the NLRA is not determinative of jurisdiction, for no explicit stricture in the Act limits the jurisdictional arm of the Board to cases which
arise out of "labor disputes." ' Moreover, the Board has jurisdiction
under section 10(a) "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice . . .affecting commerce." '83 For the purposes of the

Act, the term "affecting commerce" is defined in section 2(7) as follows:
"It]he term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce."' 84 In view of section 2(7)'s utilization of
"labor dispute" in the alternative, it is too restrictive an interpretation
of section 10(a) to limit NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
to union activities arising in the context of a labor dispute.
The Ocean Shipping court also cited the Supreme Court's decision
in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. PanamaSteamshp Co. 185 to bolster its
conclusion that section 2(9) creates a jurisdictional requirement. A
close reading of the Supreme Court's opinion reveals, however, that the
Fourth Circuit supported its construction of the Act in Ocean Shioping
with a statement made in a wholly different context.
In Marine Cooks, the Supreme Court interpreted section 1 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to determine whether it barred a district court
from issuing an injunction against union picketing of a foreign-flag vessel. In construing the term "labor dispute," the Court declared that
"Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act to curtail and regulate the
jurisdiction of the courts, not, as it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, to regulate the conduct of people engaged in labor disputes." 186 This dicta,
made in the context of a Norris-LaGuardia Act case, is not a pronouncement on the Board's power to hear unfair labor practice charges
under the NLRA. Furthermore, while it may be true that the main
function of the NLRA is to regulate parties to labor disputes, it need
not follow that the Act has no other purpose. Mere dictum, in the absence of corroborative analysis, cannot be deemed dispositive of the
§ 160(a) (1976) (Board may cede jurisdiction to a state agency even though a labor dispute affecting commerce is involved); NLRA § 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) (Board may decline jurisdic-

tion over labor disputes having an insubstantial effect on commerce).
182 Whereas the NLRA primarily employs the term "labor dispute" in its definitional sections,
see note 181 supra, the Norris-LaGuardia Act limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue

injunctions in labor disputes. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch.90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
183
184
185
186

NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
NLRA § 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976).
362 U.S. 365 (1960).
Id at 372.
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issue.

A closely related argument which the ILA presented to the First
Circuit in Allied Internationalposited that section 8(b)(4) cannot apply
to protest boycotts since there is no primary labor dispute to which the
union conduct could be secondary."8 8 Although it admitted that the
ILA had no conventional labor dispute with the Soviet Union,18 9 the
Allied Internationalcourt rejected the union's argument in light of the

congressional policies embodied in the secondary boycott provisions.
The legislative history of section 8(b)(4) demonstrates that the core
concept behind the statutory proscription of secondary boycott activity
is to shield "unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not [of] their own."' 90 Perhaps the best explanation of the
intent behind section 8(b)(4) comes from the bill's sponsor, Senator
Taft, who said:
This provision [section 8(b)(4)] makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees....
It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of
secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the provision dealing with
secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice.191
Furthermore, in the 1959 amendments to section 8(b)(4), Congress reiterated its concern with the prevention of the "suffering and hardship
[imposed by secondary boycotts] on innocent parties who are helpless
to protect themselves."'

92

Therefore, the ILA's argument is inconsis-

tent with the underlying policies of the Act. The harm to neutrals do187 The assertion by the Supreme Court in Marine Cooks is also overly broad. Under § 8(a)
and (b) of the NLRA, unfair labor practices can be committed only by employers and unions, or
their respective representatives. "Person," according to the definition in § 2(1), is not limited to
this group. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).

188 See 640 F.2d 1368, 1377-78.
189 See note 171 supra.
190 National Woodwork Manufactures Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967), rehearingdenied, 387 U.S. 926 (1967).
191 93 CONG. REc. 4323 (1947), reprintedin II NLRB LEGIsLATivE HIsTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act OF 1947, at 1106 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIsT. LMRA].
192 105 CONG. REc. 3524 (1959), reprintedin II NLRB LEGIsLATIvE HIsTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOSuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1007 (1959) (statement of Sen.
McClellan) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. LMRDA]. Similarly, Congressman Griffin, one of the
bill's sponsors, condemned the secondary boycott for this very same reason:
The secondary boycott is an un-American device whereby one attacks an enemy by coercing
or inflicting injury upon the friends of those who do business with the enemy. It is based
upon the concept of'guilt by association.' It is a method used by dictators to handle nonconformists by coercing their families and friends.
105 CoNG. REc. 14,195 (1959), reprintedin II LEG. HIST. LMRDA, at 1568.
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ing business with the Soviet Union from the effects of the Russian trade
boycott is no less serious because the controversy does not involve a
labor dispute.
Secondly, the contention that the Act is inapplicable to protest
boycotts ignores the express language of the statute.93 The prohibited
object of a boycott is stated by section 8(b)(4) to be "forcing. . .any
person to cease. . . handling. . . the products of any other producer
. . .or to cease doing business with any other person."1 94 That is the

prohibited object whether or not the union has a labor dispute with the
target of its boycott.1 95 Accordingly, both the Board' 96 and the
courts 97 have rejected the proposition that the existence of a primary
193 Section 8(b)(4) prohibits a union to strike or to induce a strike, or otherwise to coerce or

restrain an employer, when its object is "forcing or requiring any person to cease doing business
with any other person." The statute does not refer to a labor dispute with the primary target of the
secondary pressure. Likewise, to a neutral party, the immediate recipient of the union's pressure,
the ultimate object of the union's boycott is immaterial. The effect upon the neutral is the same
regardless of the source or nature of the dispute. Sound policy considerations therefore support
the contention that Congress' omission of a labor dispute requirement in § 8(b)(4) was not inadvertant.
194 NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
195 The typical secondary boycott involves a dispute between a union and a primary employer
followed by secondary activity against another employer who has business dealings with the primary employer. However, the fact that the prototype secondary boycott is more usual or frequent
in occurrence does not demonstrate that it is the only type Congress intended to reach. The legislative history of the LMRA indicates that a violation of§ 8(b)(4) is possible without the existence
of an active dispute, over specific demands, between a union and the primary disputant. Senator
Taft had spoken of a product boycott in which a neutral employer "happens to be doing business
...
93 CONG. REC.
with someone the union does not like or with whom it is having trouble.
4198 (1947), reprintedin II LEG. HiAST. LMRA, at 1107-08. Additionally, a Senate Report indicated that a secondary boycott unlawful under the Act included that where a union makes no
specific demands upon a target of the secondary pressure:
This [section] also makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in the type of
secondary boycott that has been conducted in New York City by Local No. 3 of the IBEW,
whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of manufacturers employing
electricians who are members of some labor organization other than local No. 3... .[Allen
Bradley v. Local Union 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1941)].
S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), reprintedin I LEG. HIsT. LMRA, at 428. An
examination of the Allen-Bradley case shows that the union made no express or implied demands
on the manufacturers whose products it refused to install. Roane-Anderson Co. (Local 760, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F.L.), 82 N.L.R.B. 696, 711 (1940).
196 International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied Int'l, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151,
108 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1036 (Aug. 28, 1981); Monarch Long Beach Corp. (Soft Drink Workers
Union Local 812), 243-N.L.R.B. 801, 806 (1979); National Maritime Union (Delta Steamship
Lines), 147 N.L.R.B. 1328, 1331 (1964); National Maritime Union (Weyerhauser Lines), 147
N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318 (1964); National Maritime Union (Houston Maritime Ass'n), 147 N.L.R.B.
1243, 1246-47 (1964); Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (General Millwork Corp.),
113 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1086 (1966); Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council (Sound
Shingle Co.), 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1161-62 (1953).
197 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981);
Teamsters, Local 812 v. NLRB, 105 L.R.R.M. 2658, 2663 (D.C. Cir. 1980); National Maritime
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labor dispute is a prerequisite for the application of the secondary boycott provisions. As the Allied Internationalcourt reasoned:
We think it ... [is]... objectionable that a national union has chosen to
marshall against neutral parties the considerable powers derived by its
locals and itself under federal labor laws in aid of a random political
objective far removed from what has traditionally been thought to be the
realm of legitimate union activity... . The language of section 8(b)(4)
and the congressional objectives that prompted its enactment point to no
reason why that section should not prohibit such secondary pressure, for
whatever reasons motivated. 198

The requirement of a labor dispute as a condition of NLRB jurisdiction
thus constitutes an unsupportable departure from the explicit language
and congressional intent of section 8(b)(4). Accordingly, protest boycotts are precisely the type of conduct which Congress intended to regulate with the NLRA.
B. The Requirement that a Foreign Government by "Any Other
Person" Within the Meaning of Section 8(b)(4)
The secondary boycott provisions proscribe certain union activities
where an object thereof is to require a neutral party "to cease doing
business with any other person .

.

... 199 The protest boycott theory

posits that section 8(b)(4) is violated when a union's conduct forces
American companies to cease trading with the foreign government
under union censure. Yet, one court has rejected this theory on the
ground that the statute does not encompss boycotts directed against
foreign governments. In Walsh v. InternationalLongshoremen''Association,20 the court held that the "contention that a secondary boycott
exists through the inducement of [the importer] and [the shipper] to
'cease doing business' with the U.S.S.R. must fail, as the U.S.S.R. canUnion v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines), 346 F.2d 411, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Weyerhauser Lines), 342 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965); NLRB v. Local 751, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 285 F.2d 633, 639
(9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1957);
NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, 211 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1954).
As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has most recently asserted.
The Board and courts do not approach a Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) case by attempting to fit the
challanged union activity into a categorical box labeled "secondary boycott;" rather, they
read the exact language of the section to see if it forbids what the union has done. Certain
acts, when done for a specified object are proscribed. The mere fact that the language of this
Section comprehends the familiar patterns of a secondary boycott in the customary sense
does not inexorably dictate the conclusion that it excludes all variations from those patterns.
Teamsters, Local 812 v. NLRB, supra, at 2663.
198 640 F.2d at 1378 (citations omitted).
199 NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
200 488 F. Supp. 526 (D. Mass. 1980).
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not be characterized as 'any other person' under the statute. ' 20 1 The
court, however, failed to support its conclusion with an analysis of the
issue of whether a foreign government constitutes "any other person"
under section 8(b)(4).
The NLRA employs the term "persons" as a generic term for individuals and groups who are generally subject to the Act. According to
section 2(1), "persons" include "one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.1 20 2 However, it would appear that the definition of "employer" in section 2(2) is more helpful in
determining whether a foreign government constitutes a "person"
under the Act. This provision defines an employer with reference to
certain types of persons in section 2(1): an "employer" includes "any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned government
corporation. . . or any State or political subdivision thereof....
Despite the absence of any clear legislative history on the subject,204 and a permissible interpretation to the contrary based upon the
wording of the Act,2 5 the Board has consistently held that foreign gov201
202
203
204

Id at 531 n.5.
NLRA § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
The dearth of legislative history on the subject may be due to the fact that Congress never

realized that foreign government corporations might one day operate in the United States, and
thereby be made subject to the NLRA. The few available remarks on the question of whether
Congress in fact exercised its constitutional power to apply the Act to employers with substantial
foreign contacts indicate that only American workingmen were the concern of Congress. See
H.R. RaP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprintedin I LEo. HIST. LMRA, at 295 (remarks of Rep. Hartley).
205 It might be argued that a foreign government should be excluded from the definition of
"employer" as the plain language of the Act exempts the United States government or "any wholy
owned Government corporation.... " 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (emphasis added). According to
this construction of the statute, if Congress had meant to limit the government corporation exception to instrumentalities of the United States government, it could have done so explicitly.
It should be noted that a state can be "any other person" for purposes of§ 8(b)(4). Local 399,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Illinois Bell Telephone Co.), 235 N.L.R.B. 555, 560 (1978); Local 3,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Mansfield Contracting Corp.), 205 N.L.R.B. 559, 562 (1973). Thus, if
a union directs its protest boycott against a state, see note 4 supra, the union activities are cognizable under the secondary boycott provisions. While the federal government is expressly excluded
from the definition of "employer" under the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), it would appear
that it would qualify as "any other person" within the meaning of§ 8(b)(4). See Douds v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of North America, 148 F. Supp. 953, 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (Maritime Administration, although an agency of the U.S. government, is "any other person" for purposes of the
secondary boycott provisions); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Locals 1248 & 1458 (U.S.
Naval Supply Center), 195 N.L.R.B. 273, 274 (1972) (Navy is "any other person" under § 8(b)(4)).
Thus, protest boycotts aimed at the United States government, see note 4 supra, would also be
subject to the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4). Cf. Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318
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ernments qualify as employers under section 2(2) of the Act. °6 If an
entity qualifies as an "employer" for the purposes of the Act, it would
be inconsistent to deny that same entity the status of a "person!' under
section 2(1). Thus, as the Russian government operates vessels in
American ports, and transacts business with American exporters and
importers, "any other person" should be interpreted to include a foreign government for the purposes of the secondary boycott provisions.
The rationale of the Walsh court is therefore incorrect.
In AlliedInternational,the First Circuit held that the ILA violated
section 8(b)(4) without discussing whether the Soviet Union constituted
"any other person" under the statute. The court also avoided a consideration of the reasoning of the Walsh decision. Instead, the lliedInternational court implied that the requirements of the secondary
boycott provisions were satisfied on
account of a cessation of business
20 7
relations between neutral parties.

The Board's opinion in InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation,
Local 799 also avoided the issue of whether a foreign government is a
"person" as defined by section 2(1) of the Act. Instead, the NLRB asserted that section 8(b)(4) had been violated on account of the termination of business relationships between neutral stevedoring and shipping
companies. Its discussion of the question, however, was relegated to a
footnote. 08
While the analyses of both the First Circuit and the Board fail to
undertake a thorough consideration of the issue, case law supports the
proposition that the cessation of business between two neutral employers 'satisfies section 8(b)(4). 2° In the context of the Russian trade boy(1978) (a foreign nation is a "person" within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act which authorizes "any person" injured by antitrust violations to sue for treble damages in federal court).
206 S.K. Products Corp. (Warehouse, Mail Order, Office, Technical, & Prof. Emp. Union, Local
No. 743), 230 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977); State Bank of India (Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union), 229 N.L.R.B. 838 (1977). In State Bank oflndia, the Board specifically rejected the bank's argument, that as an instrumentality of a foreign government, it did not
come within the definition of "employer" under § 2(2). Id at 840. See note 205 supra.
207 640 F.2d at 1375.
208 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1042 n.43.
209 See National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines), 346 F.2d 411, 418-19
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Weyerhauser
Lines), 342 F.2d 538, 545-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965); Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1963); McLeod v. United Auto Workers,
Local 365, 200 F. Supp. 778, 781-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. (Int'l Org. of
Masters, Mates & Pilots, AFL-CIO), 197 N.L.R.B. 363, 365 (1972); Miller & Soloman Const.
Corp. (Local 272, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers), 195 N.L.R.B.
1063, 1063 n.5 (1972); Monroe Building Const. Trades Council (Jack W. Royce), 189 N.L.R.B.
295, 299 (1971); National Maritime Union (Delta Steamship Lines), 147 N.L.R.B. 1328, 1331-32
(1964); National Maritime Union (Weyerhauser Lines), 147 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1326 (1964); Miami

259

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3:211(1981)

cott, "any other person" could thus be a firm engaged in foreign trade
with the U.S.S.R., or a shipowner transporting cargoes to or from the
Soviet Union. Under this formulation, the ILA's pressure forced neutral stevedore firms to "cease doing business with any other person,"
i.e., neutrals transporting or trading products with Russia.
Union conduct similar to the ILA's boycott will always precipitate
cessation between neutrals, since the transportation of goods between
American companies and foreign countries necessarily involves various

carriers which importers and exporters hire to move products through
international markets.2 1 ° A protest boycott affecting imports and exports will therefore terminate business dealings between shipping, rail,
and trucking firms. Thus, the failure of a foreign government to attain
the status of "any other person" under section 8(b)(4) is not fatal to the
protest boycott theory.
C. The Requirement That the Primary Dispute be "In Commerce"
The ILA argued successfully in Baldovin that since its primary dispute with the Soviet Union was not "in commerce," it would be inconsistent to confer Board jurisdiction over the secondary effects of the
boycott on neutral, domestic employers.2 1' However, the contrary
view, that a union's pressure upon domestic firms is subject to the secondary boycott provisions despite a lack of jurisdiction over the primary dispute, finds solid support in the language of section 8(b)(4).
The provision expressly requires that the neutral, secondary employer
21 2
be "engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce.
Yet, it requires only that the primary object of the secondary pressure
be "any other person." According to section 2(1) of the Act, a "person"
is not required either to be "engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce," or otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the
NLRA.2 13
Despite the literal language of section 8(b)(4), the protest boycott
theory must confront the Supreme Court's decision in American Radio
Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1352
(1962); United Marine Div., Local 333 (Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n), 107 N.L.1B. 686, 711
(1954).
210 For example, in the context of the ILA boycott of Iranian cargoes, see note 39 supra, neutral
parties included ocean shipping firms, railroads, and trucking companies. Since a protest boycott

instituted by the ILA on the waterfront (or for that matter, any other union in the transportation
process) would necessarily stop the transportation of imports and exports, the termination of business between carriers will always satisfy the cease doing business requirement of § 8(b)(4).
211 See note 153 supra.
212 NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
213 NLRA § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
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Association v. Mobile Steamsh- Association.214 In Mobile Steamsh#p,

the Court determined that the NLRA did not preempt state court jurisdiction where a domestic stevedoring company, employing longshoremen who honored the picketing of foreign flagships, sought a state
court injunction against the secondary aspects of the primary picketing.2 15 In short, Mobile Steamshp stands for the proposition that the

effect of the union's picketing of the foreign flag vessels (an activity not
"in commerce" under WindwardShipping) on the businesses of the domestic stevedoring companies provides no basis for prohibition under
the secondary boycott provisions. Finally, and most importantly, a bifurcated view of "commerce" is not permitted, for the effect of the
union's activities on American entities provides no "basis for Board
jurisdiction where the primary dispute is beyond its statutory authority ....

216

The Supreme Court's decision also made clear that its holding
"[c]ast no doubt on [the GrainElevator Workers decisions] which hold
that the Board has jurisdiction under [8(b)(4)] of domestic secondary
activities which are in commerce, even though the primary employer is
located outside the United States. 217 Moreover, the Court acknowledged the vitality of several cases providing that the Board may exercise jurisdiction over the secondary aspects of primary disputes which,
for various reasons, the NLRB lacked jurisdiction.2 1 Though some of
these cases are distinguishable from Mobile Steamship, the decisions
arguably support the theory that the preemption doctrine should apply
to secondary boycotts even where the primary dispute is beyond the
reach of the Board's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the majority in Mobile
Steamship neither provided a rationale for reconciling these cases with
its decision nor overruled them outright.2 19 The protest boycott theory
214 419 U.s. 215 (1974).
215 Id at 220.
216 Id (emphasis in original).
217 Id at 225 n.10 (citations omitted). The cases referred to are Grain Elevator, Flour and
Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932
(1967), and Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014
(7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965). For a discussion of the GrainElevator Workers
cases, see text accompanying notes 230-33 infra.
218 Id at 228, citing Plumbers Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959) and Local 25,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).

219 Numerous commentators have criticized the reasoning of Mobile Steamsho on this ground.
See Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Tem The Allocation of Power in Deciding Labor Law
Policy, 62 VA. L. REv. 533, 568-69 (1976); Ross, American Legal Restrictionson the Use of Union
Economic Weapons Against MultinationalEmployers, 10 CORNELL INTL .J. 59, 67, 80 (1976);
Comment, LaborLaw-NationalLabor RelationsAct--State CourtJurisdictionto Enjoin Picketing
ofa ForeignFlag VesselbyAmerican Unions is not Preemptedby the NationalLaborRelationsAct
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must therefore be reconciled with and distinguished from the results
reached in Mobile Steamship and the GrainElevator Workers cases.
The genesis for the case law providing that the NLRA allows the
exercise of jurisdiction over the secondary aspects of a primary dispute
over which the NLRB has no jurisdiction is the Board's decision in
Sailor's Union of the Pac/c (MooreDry Dock).220 In this case, a Panamanian ship berthed in the petitioner's dry dock for repairs was picketed by American maritime unions protesting the loss of domestic jobs
to foreign seamen and seeking recognition as the bargaining agent of
the ship's employees. The NLRB dismissed the union's petition to be
certified as the bargaining representative of the employees for lack of
jurisdiction, "inasmuch as the internal economy of a vessel of foreign
registry and ownership [was] involved."221
Simultaneous with the dismissal of the union's petition for representation, the Board took cognizance of the dry dock company's complaint seeking to enjoin the picketing of the ship on the grounds that it
constituted an illegal secondary boycott.222 In analyzing the section
8(b)(4) issue, the NLRB observed that the problem "is one of balancing
the right of a union to picket at the site of its dispute as against the right
of a secondary employer to be free from picketing in a controversy in
which it is not directly involved. 223 In holding that the picketing constituted primary activity and not an illegal secondary boycott, the
Board set out four conditions to be satisfied before picketing on the
premises of secondary employer can be considered primary and therefore deserving of protection under the NLRA.3 Thus, the plain implication of Moore Dry Dock is that section 8(b)(4) applies to the
secondary aspects of picketing, notwithstanding the Board's lack of jurisdiction over the primary dispute.225
Justice Stewart in his dissent in Mobile Steamshp relied upon this
reading of Moore Dry Dock as precedent for granting the NLRB jurisdiction over the secondary aspects of a primary dispute outside the coyEven Though the Injunctive Reif Was Sought by an American Employer Wiose Employees
HonoredthePicket Lines, 27 ALA. L. REv. 649,664 (1975);ForeignShips, supra note 121, at 62-63.
220 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
221 Id at 560. For similar reasons, the Supreme Court declared inMcCulloch that the NLRA
should not be construed to allow the Board to conduct a representation election for alien crews

aboard a foreign ship pursuant to a petition filed by an American union. See text accompanying
notes 113-18 supra.
222 92 N.L.R.B. at 549.
223 Id
2241Id

225 Justice Douglas advanced this view in his dissent in Benz. See Benz v. Campania Naviera
Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 148 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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erage of the Act. 6 The majority disagreed with this reading of Moore
Dry Dock. Justice Rhenquist asserted that a "1950 Board precedent
such as [Moore Dry Dock] can scarcely be regarded as controlling when
it is clearly contrary to the thrust of this Court's Benz- Windward [Sh7pping] line of cases." 7 A careful reading of these decisions, however,
belies the assertion that Moore Dry Dock is antithetical to the rationale
of the Benz- WindwardShipping decisions.
The Benz Court, in examining aprimary dispute between aforeign
shipowner and an American union, found the rationale of Moore Dry
Dock inapposite since the Board's decision involved a secondary dispute between a domestic shipowner and union. Thus, the Benz Court
distinguished Moore Dry Dock for the very reason that the Windward
Shipping dissenters criticized Justice Rhenquist's reading of the
Board's decision."' Moreover, the policy concerns of the Benz- WindwardShipping family of cases are not contradicted by allowing an exercise of jurisdiction over a secondary dispute as postulated by the Moore
Dry Dock rationale. The cases preceding Mobile Steamshp that deal
with suits by foreign shipowners against American unions stand for the
proposition that the internal operations of foreign flag vessels are not
"in commerce," and thus are not subject to federal labor laws. As the
Court in Windward Shipping reasoned, jurisdiction over the primary
dispute would necessarily impact either the internal management and
affairs of the carrier, or endanger "long-standing principles of comity
and accommodation in international maritime trade." 22 9 Yet, these
concerns are not implicated by halting an illegal secondary boycott directed against United States companies. For one, no attempt is made
to regulate or apply the Act to the internal affairs of any foreign ships
or companies. Further, no conflict between foreign and American laws
can result from enjoining a secondary boycott in this country. Therefore, the Mobile Steamship opinion fails to provide a cogent rationale
for its departure from the logic of the theory enunciated in the Moore
Dry Dock case.
In Mobile Steamship, the Court expressed approval of the Grain
Elevator Workers decisions, two cases which sustained the NLRB's jurisdiction over secondary disputes involving American employers and
unions despite the fact that the accompanying primary dispute was not
"in commerce." In Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill
226 419 U.S. at 234 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
227 Id at 227.

228 See 353 U.S. at 143 n.5.
229 415 U.S. at 113-14.
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Workers, Local 418230 and Grain Elevator,Flourand FeedMill Workers, Local 418 v. NLRB,231 the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits examined an identical secondary boycott by a union in the United
States in support of a Canadian union engaged in a labor dispute with
a Canadian shipper. The employees of Continental Grain Company,
an American corporation, who were members of an American union,
refused to load the Canadian shipper's vessels in order to support the
picketing of the shipper by the Canadian union 3 2 The Board successfully petitioned both courts for an injunction against Local 418 based
on section 8(b)(4). In rejecting the contention that the NLRB lacked
jurisdiction because the subject matter of the dispute involved the internal affairs of Canadian parties, the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned "that the Board is not . . . exercising jurisdiction over the

Canadian primary dispute, but over the secondary activity in this country, 'directed against an American labor organization and involving
employees working in a domestic plant of the American employer.' ,m
The protest boycott theory is also reconcilable with the rationale of
the Grain Elevator Workers cases and Mobile Steamship. The complaints in WindwardShipping, as in both GrainElevator Workers cases,
concerned domestic secondary boycotts resulting from primary disputes which were not "in commerce." In Mobile Steamship, the finding
that the secondary picketing was not within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB rested on the nature of the primary dispute giving rise to the
secondary activity. As the Supreme Court noted, "the affect of the
picketing on the operations of the stevedores and shippers.

. .

is pre-

cisely the same whether it be complained of by the foreign-ship owners
or by the [domestic employers] seeking to service and deal with the
ships. '2 34 Thus, in Mobile Steamship, the Court stressed the inextricable intertwining of the primary and secondary effects of the same conduct. However, in the Grain Elevator Workers cases, the only union
activity involved secondary picketing undertaken against a domestic
employer. Moreover, as the union conduct was purely secondary, there
was no risk that assertion of Board jurisdiction would intrude upon
foreign interests. Whereas Mobile Steamship precluded jurisdiction
over primary conduct interfering with foreign maritime relations and
inextricably involving secondary employers, jurisdiction was proper in
230 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965).
231 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967).
232 Id at 775.
233 Id at 778, quoting Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, Local 418, 334
F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965).
234 419 U.S. at 224-25.
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the Grain Elevator Workers cases as the union's secondary picketing
focused exclusively on domestic employers. This distinction provides
an explanation for the Court's assertion that the holding in Mobile
Steamshp "cast[s] no doubt on" the GrainElevator Workers cases.23 5
In the protest boycott situation, the application of section 8(b)(4)
to a union's secondary pressure against domestic businesses is directly
analogous to the reasoning of the Grain Elevator Workers cases. First,
international comity concerns are not implicated, for NLRB jurisdiction would portend no interference in the management or affairs of any
foreign country. Moreover, no conflict between the policies of the
United States and a foreign government can result from halting a secondary boycott, directed against American employers and involving
employees working in domestic industries. In short, the effect of Board
cognizance over protest boycotts would not produce the sort of international reverberations which would warrant a limitation upon the jurisdictional reach of the NLRA.

Likewise, the logic of the Mobile Steamshp decision does not contradict the protest boycott theory. In Mobile Steamshp, the Court rejected a bifurcated view of union activity for jurisdictional purposes:
"[s]ince Windward Shpping held that . . . the picketing [of foreign
shipowners] was not in or affecting commerce, it would be inconsistent
to now hold, insofar as concerns Board jurisdiction over a complaint by
[domestic employers,] that the employer of the longshoremen. . . was
in or affecting commerce." 6 The rejection of a bifurcated view of the
union's actions resulted from the fact that both the primary and the
secondary effects of the same picketing interfered with foreign maritime operations. For this reason, both the First Circuit in Allied International and the Board in InternationalLongshoremen's Association,
Local 799 reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile
Steamship did not foreclose NLRB jurisdiction over the Russian trade
boycott.
In Allied International,the First Circuit read Mobile Steamship as
establishing that in a case of interrelated labor disputes, particularly
disputes that give rise to similar conduct carried on at a single site, "a
primary dispute cannot be extricated from a secondary dispute for purposes of contrary jurisdictional findings." 2 7 As jurisdiction over the
ILA's secondary pressure of domestic employers did not involve separation of the primary and secondary effects of single union action, the
235 Id. at 215 n.10.
236 Id. at 214.
237 640 F.2d at 1374.
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First Circuit viewed the Russian trade boycott as analogous to the pick-

eting in the Grain Elevator Workers cases. Similarly, the Board concluded in InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation, Local 799 that the
union's conduct was purely secondary and domestic, and thus distin-

guishable from Mobile Steamship. Thus, the NLRB limited Mobile
Steamship to the proposition that "where primary activity interferes
with foreign maritime relations and inextricably involves the secondary

employers, the Board is prohibited from asserting jurisdiction over the
primary conduct or its secondary effects. . ..

[; for this reason,] there is

...no bar to our assertion of jurisdiction [over the Russian trade boycott]."

238

The reading given Mobile Steamshop by both the First Circuit and
the Board is in harmony with the underlying purposes of the Act. 3 9
Jurisdiction over protest boycotts would not entail bifurcation of the
effects of single union action which the Supreme Court disapproved in
Mobile Steamshi#. The only labor dispute extant is a secondary boycott involving the ILA and American employers. Moreover, the fact

that the boycott was inspired by military events in a foreign country
does not counsel against the application of section 8(b)(4) to a domestic
labor dispute. In short, none of the considerations that prompted a
limit upon the NLRB's jurisdiction in WindwardShiping, Incres and

Benz are present in the context of a protest boycott. Thus, the assertion
of jurisdiction over protest boycotts is consistent with the Grain Elevator Workers cases, and reconcilable with the result reached in Mobile

Steamshi .
238 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1039.
239 In contrast to the reasoning of the First Circuit and the NLRB, the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Baldovin construed the MindwardShipping-MobileSteamship test in very broad terms. See text
accompanying notes 143-52 supra. A comparison of the analyses of Baldovin and the Allied Internationaldecisions in the context of non-maritime protest boycotts, however, yields the conclusion
that the reasoning of the First Circuit and the Board is consonant with the underlying purposes of
§ 8(b)(4). For example, mine workers strike against an American steel company (which imports
South African steel) located in Alabama for the purpose of protesting the apartheid policy of the
Republic of South Africa. The First Circuit and the Board would allow NLRB jurisdiction over
the secondary aspects of the strike against the American firm, as the concerns of Windward Shipping andMobile Steamshop are not implicated by enjoining a domestic strike. Although the Fifth
Circuit had earlier intimated that an employer suffering from a similar protest boycott could obtain a remedy through § 8(b)(4), United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d
1236, 1247 n.23 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976), the Baldavin court asserted that
the NLRB would not possess jurisdiction over such a strike. See Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445, 454 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980). In light of the Fifth Circuit's assertion
that "the object of a dispute determines whether or not it is 'in commerce,"'" id at 453, it is
difficult to conceive of any protest boycott (maritime or non-maritime) to which the NLRA would
apply under the Baldovin rationale.
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D. Elements Required to Prove a Section 8(b)(4) Violation

Section 8(b)(4) has been called one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal statute,240 for a literal reading of the
section does not provide ready answers to the many problems of interpretation that have arisen in examining secondary boycotts. The
meaning of the statutory language is neither obvious nor intuitive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a literal construction
of the provision would ban most strikes historically considered to be
lawful primary activity.241 Furthermore, though section 8(b)(4) does
not explicitly mention "primary" or "secondary" boycotts, strikes or
disputes, the legislative history of the Act refers to the section as the
"secondary boycott" provision.' Congress directed the impact of the
section toward "what is known as the secondary boycott whose 'sanction[s] bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute,
but upon some third party who has no concern in it.' "243
Though the distinction between legitimate "primary activity" and
banned "secondary activity" is crucial, section 8(b)(4) fails to present a
bright line marking out a frontier between the two concepts. Thus, in
an effort to yield an integrated set of standards by which union activities may be measured against the statute, the Board and the courts have
utilized a means-object test to determine the legality of union conduct.
Both an illegal means--threatening, coercing or restraining the secondary employer-and an illegal object-forcing the secondary employer
to cease doing business with the primary employer-must be estabfished to prove a violation. 2' It is against this general test that protest
boycotts must be measured.
1. Threatening, Coercing or Restraining the Secondary Employer
Subsection (ii) of section 8(b)(4) makes it unlawful for a union "to
240 Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1086, 1113 (1960). The Supreme Court has observed that "[nlo cosmic principles announce the
existence of secondary conduct, condemn it as an evil or delimit its boundaries"' Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386 (1969). This difficulty is further
compounded by language wanting in clarity and a confusing legislative history, both of which are
the "product of compromise of the closely divided Congress that enacted the words into law."
BARTOSiC & HARTLEY, supra note 20, at 124.
241 See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1956).
242 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681 (1951).
243 Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961),
quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (1955) (Hand, L., J.).
244 See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1956); Teamsters,
Local 812 v. NLRB, 105 L.R.R.M. 2664, 2668 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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24 5
threaten, coerce or restrain any person" for proscribed objects.
Whether a union pursues its object by threatening, coercing or restraining a neutral business goes not to the motive underlying the boycott, but to the natural and foreseeable consequences of the pressure
which the union has brought to bear upon the neutral. In the protest
boycott situation, this conduct takes the form of union pressure
designed to impede the operation of domestic businesses.
In the context of the Russian trade boycott, one can argue that the
ILA's manipulative use of its hiring hall arrangement with stevedoring
companies is a form of coercion undertaken against neutral parties for
the purpose of forcing them to cease doing business with the Soviet
Union. Since the ILA has no dispute with stevedoring firms, the action
of the union in refusing to refer longshoremen to these neutral parties
involves them in a dispute not of their own. The union's action in furtherance of its disagreement with Soviet foreign policy is therefore precisely the type of direct economic pressure upon neutral persons which
the Congress intended to prohibit with the secondary boycott provisions.
A union's manipulative abuse of its hiring hall arrangement with a
neutral employer was clearly contemplated by Congress in the 1959
Amendments to section 8(b)(4) to be a form of coercion. As Congressman Rhodes declared, refusal to refer was one of the loopholes in the
secondary boycott provisions which the 1959 Amendments were intended to remedy:
. . . a union with a hiring hall system... may also coerce a secondary
employer into ceasing to use products of some other company by denying
him access to the craftsmen on the hiring hall list. This [Amendment]
makes such direct coercion of an employer unlawful by insertion of clause
4(ii) forbidding threats or coercion of 'any person engaged in commerce
or an industry affecting commerce.'24 6
The argument that the ILA's refusal to refer its members to load or
unload Russian cargoes pursuant to hiring hall arrangements with
stevedoring companies satisfies the "threaten, coerce and restrain" requirement is therefore consistent with the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to section 8(b)(4). In InternationalLongshoremen's Association,
Local 799, the Board accepted such a position, and held that the union
had violated subsection (ii) of section 8(b)(4) since it had "threatened,
coerced, and restrained [domestic employers] with a refusal to refer
245 NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1976).
246 105 CoN. lnc. 14,208 (1959), reprintedin II LEO. HIST. LMRDA, at 1581. See also 105
CoNG. REc. 5971 (1959), reprintedin II LEo. HIST. LMRDA, at 1194 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
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[ILA] members for unloading cargo emanating from the USSR."24 7

The district court in Walsh, however, rejected the argument that
an ILA local's refusal to refer longshoremen to stevedoring companies
constituted threats, coercion or restraint. According to Judge Skinner,
a bare refusal to refer does not contravene section 8(b)(4), for "union
members have simply declined to accept employment on certain ships,
as a form of political protest."2 48 For support, the court referred to the
reasoning of the Ocean Shiping decision. In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that should a mere refusal to refer, unaccompanied by any
other acts, be deemed illegal, "the union would be deprived of its rights
of expression and. . . section 8(b)(4)(B) would be emptied of meaning.

24 9

The Ocean Shipping court believed that the refusal to refer longshoremen to work one ship which had engaged in Cuban trade "is not
itself coercive."25 0 The opinion intimated that a refusal to refer would
not amount to coercion until the union instituted a general work stoppage against the neutral.2 51 However, this reasoning conflicts with
other circuits which have adopted the approach that a refusal to refer
which substantially hinders the neutral's business with the primary
252
constitutes "restraint or coercion."
A union restrains the neutral employer whenever the deliberate
actions of the former hinder the latter in doing business with the primary employer. In Walsh, the ILA's refusal to refer its members to a
stevedoring company to unload Russian cargoes caused substantial dislocation of business between it and Allied, the importer of the Soviet
goods. Since eighty-five percent of Allied's imports originated in the
U.S.S.R., and accounted for $25 million in annual revenues, the ILA's
247 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1042. A violation of the secondary boycott provi-

sions may also be premised upon subsection (i) of § 8(b)(4). Under this provision, a union engages in illegal action when it "induce[s] or.encourage[s] any individual employed by any person"
to strike, boycott, or refuse to handle any goods for proscribed objects. In the context of the
Russian trade boycott, the Board determined that the ILA had "induced and encouraged their
members to engage in refusals in the course of the employment by [the stevedore firm] to process
or otherwise handle Soviet cargoes owned by [the importer]...." Id.

248 488 F. Supp. at 531.
249 NLRB v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992, 997 (4th
Cir. 1964).
250 Id. at 998.
251 Id at 997.
252 NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1973);
Local No. 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 368 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 315 F.2d

695, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local No. 107, 300 F.2d
317, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1962).
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boycott restrained and coerced Allied although the union's activity
stopped short of a general work stoppage. 253 For this reason, the
Fourth Circuit's view of what constitutes threats, coercion or restraint is
excessively narrow. In light of the purpose of the 1959 Amendment's
inclusion of clause (ii) into section 8(b)(4), any refusal to refer which
tends to exert pressure on the neutral should be considered sufficient to
constitute restraint or coercion.25 4

Perhaps one explanation of the Ocean Shipping court's (and subsequently the Walsh court's) disinclination to characterize the ILA's refusal to refer as coercive results from the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers
(Tree Fruits).255 The Fourth Circuit analogized the refusal to refer for
work upon one vessel to the narrow consumer appeal being made in
Tree Fruits which the Supreme Court has concluded to be legal under
section 8(b)(4). The Tree Fruits Court held that a union could picket
the retail outlet of a struck product if it confined its appeal to urging
customers not to purchase the product. 5 6 The Court interpreted the
section to allow the union activity in the absence of a contrary congressional intent, so as to avoid first amendment questions inherent in the
prohibition of union picketing. 257 Yet, in Ocean Shipping, as in the
context of the Russian trade boycott, this problem is absent, for the
ILA made no appeal to the public concerning the Soviet Union. For
this reason, section 8(b)(4) would not be emptied of meaning by enjoining a protest boycott. First, the proviso to the secondary boycott
provisions protects legitimate primary activities, something which is
very different from union conduct undertaken against neutral parties.
Second, a prohibition against the union's work stoppage would not deprive the ILA or its members of their right of expression. Alternative
forms of expression exist, including the right to assemble or leaflet in
protest of Soviet aggression, the opportunity to picket the Russian em253 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1041. The union's conduct also caused substantial
dislocation of business relationships between the shipper and the stevedore. Upon learning of the
ILA boycott, the shipper, Waterman Steamship Lines, repudiated its future agreement to carry
wood products from Leningrad to Boston aboard the vessel Jefferson for the importer Allied. 488
F.Supp. at 526. Additionally, Waterman restricted the cargo being loaded on the ship Middleton
in Leningrad to one-third its scheduled size, cancelled its scheduled delivery to several U.S. ports,
and unloaded the wood products in Montreal. Id Thus, as stevedores could not be obtained
through any other sources, the refusal to refer ILA members exerted pressure on Waterman to
refrain from servicing Allied.
254 See note 246 supra, See also II LEo. HIST. LMRA, at 989, 1079, 1523, 1568, and 1581.
255 332 F.2d at 994, citing 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
256 377 U.S. at 63.
257 Id
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bassy and consular offices, and the right to petition and lobby elected
officas to effectuate a reassessment of United States foreign policy regarding American-Russian trade.5 8
The Allied Internationalcourt rejected the view that protest boycotts are exempted from section 8(b)(4) as a form of political expression.25 9 As the First Circuit reasoned, "prohibiting the [union's
boycott] ...would [not] rob either the ILA or its members of their
[since its] resort to coercive tactics. . . ex'right of expression' ....
ceed[s] the bounds of 'political expression' in its pure form." 260 The
NLRB dismissed the union's first amendment arguments in shorter
form, holding that the application of "section 8(b)(4) to such conduct
imposes no impermissible restrictions on constitutionally protected
speech."26'
Despite the political nature of protest boycotts, a fact which lead
the Ocean Shipping and Walsh courts to afford such conduct first
amendment protection, section 8(b)(4)'s regulation of a partial refusal
to refer should not be subjected to a narrow reading under the rationale
of Tree Fruits. Rather, a partial refusal to refer union workers should
258 For a discussion of the American labor movement's endeavors to influence United States
foreign policy "through democratic processes," see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. Interestingly, the administrative law judge conducting factual findings in the consolidated unfair
labor practice proceedings against the ILA found that "[t]here is little support.. . for the claim
that [union president] Gleason's directive merely expressed the overwhelming desire of the membership ....,for there is no] testimony about a flood of sentiment pouring in on him from ILA
members throughout the nation .... " International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied
Int'l,Inc.), Case No. 1-CC-1753, slip op. at 3 (Mar. 16, 1981). In addition, one court noted that the
ILA directive implementing the Russian trade boycott may have forced union members to express
themselves contrary to the views of some:
rT]he Union's position that its action constitute [sic] only the joint expression of its members'
opinion.., is neither factually nor legally supportable. No evidence of a mandate from the
Union's membership has been presented, nor did the Union make any effort to notify its
members of employees that Union members who wished to work or who did not support this
action could ignore the Union's order without fear of retaliation.
Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Locals 1248 & 1963, Civ.
No. 80-186-N, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 1980), rey'don othergrounds, 631 F.2d 282 (4th
Cir. 1980).
259 640 F.2d at 1378-79. The conclusion of the First Circuit accords with well established case
law. There is no reason § 8(b)(4)(B) should be deemed inapplicable because the ILA's activities
are politically motivated. As early as 1949 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that regulation of picketing and other concerted activity violated either the first or the thirteenth amendments. United Autoworkers, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton),
336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949). Two years later the Court upheld the constitutionality of the secondary
boycott provisions, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951), and
determined that § 8(b)(4)'s regulation of union activity is not violative of the first amendment.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
260 640 F.2d at 1378-79.
261 251 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1041 n.38.
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be deemed sufficient to maintain an action under the statute if the
union has an object of forcing a neutral to cease doing business with
persons trading with the target of the union's action, the U.S.S.R.
2. The Forbidden Object-To Force the Cessation of Business
The second element of a violation of section 8(b)(4) necessitates a
finding that the challenged union conduct have as a goal the forcing or
requiring of a neutral employer to cease doing business with another
person. Absent an impermissible object, the union's conduct is protected primary activity.
The ILA's posture throughout the Russian trade boycott was to
characterize its activity as a passive, political protest against the militaristic designs of the Soviet government. 2 62 For this reason, the union
maintained that any cessation in business dealings between the
U.S.S.R. and American companies was not an object of its work stoppage, but rather, the unintended effects attendant their protest against
Soviet military policy. As the union contended in argument before the
Fifth Circuit in Baldovin:
Longshoremen have elected to bear the economic consequences in the
form of lost wages rather than participate in an abhorrent venture. This is
Their
the express and demonstrable object of the ILA's action ....
policy,
and
quarrel is solely with the Soviets over that nation's2political
3
their response is conscientious, personal abstention.
Thus, while the ILA's conduct obviously had affected the business of
neutral employers, the union contended its boycott was lawful absent a
proscribed object.
The protest boycott theory, however, would posit that the foreseeable and inevitable consequence of the union's conduct is the cessation
of business between American companies and the foreign government
under the union's interdiction. Hence, whatever the ILA's ultimate object, at least one goal of the union's conduct was to force domestic companies to cease doing business with the Soviet Union. Even accepting
the ILA's characterization of its boycott, the union's goal was furthered
by causing stevedores and shippers to cease handling Russian goods.
The resulting cutback in trade with the U.S.S.R. served to direct its
protest, if only symbolically or through economic force, to the Soviet
government.
Despite the fact that a protest boycott may have several motives,
262 Brief of ILA at 14, 16, 26, 28, 31-32, 34, 39, Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Reply Brief of ILA at 10, 15, 16, id
263 Brief of ILA at 15, id
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the secondary boycott provisions do not require that the sole object of
the activity be one prescribed by the statute. Such an interpretation of
secondary boycott provisions finds solid support in the legislative history of the Act. 2" As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, section 8(b)(4) dictates only that "an object" of the boycott be one which
contravenes the statute, and conduct that has such an intermediate object, if prohibited, is not protected merely because the ultimate object is
beyond the proscription of the Act.26 5
In cases involving mixed motives, the Board and the courts look to
the totality of the union's conduct in determining whether the motive
claimed by the Union is pretextual, and whether an object of the conduct complained of is proscribed by section 8(b)(4). 2 6 6 As the Supreme
Court asserted in NLRB v. Ppi#70tting Local No. 638, "this issue turns
on whether the boycott was addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees, and is therefore primary
conduct, or whether the boycott was tactically calculated to satisfy
union objectives elsewhere," in which event the boycott would be prohibited secondary activity.2 67 In Allied International,the First Circuit
trade boycott was
followed this test and determined that the Russian
"calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. '2 68
Since the ILA had no dispute with neutral employers, the targets
of the boycott, the conclusion of the First Circuit is correct. As the
court reasoned, "[w]hen a union orders all employees of a neutral employer to cease handling goods originating from a particular source, it
is afortiori forcing that employer to 'cease doing business' with that
source." 269 For this reason, the court observed that the object of a protest boycott "can be inferred from the inevitable results generated by
it."2 70 Since it is logical to conclude that the ILA intended the foreseeable consequences of its refusal to handle Russian cargoes, the union,
in coercing neutrals to cease doing business with the U.S.S.R., utilized
264 The sponsor of the statute, Senator Taft, stated in his supplementary analysis of the secon-

dary boycott provision: "[s]ection 8(b)(4), relating to illegal strikes and boycotts, was amended in
conference by striking out the words 'for the purpose of and inserting the clause 'where an object
thereof is.'" 93 CONG. REc. 6662 (1947), reprintedin II LEG. HIST. LMRA, at 1579.
265 NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers (Burns & Roe), 400 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1971);
Carpenters Local 74 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707, 713 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
266 See NLRB v. Pipefitting Local No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 511 (1976); NLRB v. Plumbers Local
307, 469 F.2d 403,408 (7th Cir. 1972); IBEW Local 480 v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Teamsters, Local 812 (Monarch Long Beach Corp.), 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 804-06 (1979).

267 429 U.S. at 511.

268 640 F.2d at 1377.

269 Id at 1375 (emphasis in original).
270 Id
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the resulting cessation of business as a means of expressing its disapproval over the Afghanistan invasion. In essence, the union's intent is
evidenced by the very nature of its conduct. Thus, since the cessation
of business is tactically used for its effect upon the Soviet Union, an
impermissible object necessary to prove a violation of section 8(b)(4) is
present.2 7
Although the Board agreed that the ILA's boycott of Russian cargoes stemmed from an unlawful object, the NLRB reached this conclusion with a different analysis. The Board assessed the object of the
Russian trade boycott with reference to the Supreme Court's decision
in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 101 (Safeco).272 In
Retail Store Employees, the Court examined a section 8(b)(4) challenge
to union picketing undertaken against neutral title insurance companies who derived over ninety percent of their incomes from their business with Safeco, the primary employer of the union's membership. In
determining whether the union's object was one proscribed by Section
8(b)(4), the Court focused exclusively on the nature of the foreseeable
injury to the neutral parties. Accordingly, the Court determined that
picketing that "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties
with ruin or substantial loss" violates section 8(b)(4) as its purpose is to
employers to cease doing business with the primary
force the neutral
273
employer.
In the context of the Russian trade boycott, the NLRB was of the
opinion that the object of the ILA's conduct could likewise be gleaned
through the test promulgated in Retail Store Employees. First, the
Board determined that the boycott of Russian cargoes could be ex271 The union conduct condemned by the Eightieth Congress was characterized as "a strike
against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with em... S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
ployer B [the employer with whom the union has a dispute].
1st Sess. 22 (1947), reprintedin I LEG. HIsT. LMRA, at 428. Yet, when the union engages in a
protest boycott, the calculus of secondary pressure is reformulated: the union pressures neutral
companies trading with the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of forcing Russia to alter its conduct (i.e., to
withdraw from Afghanistan) by causing it to lose the business of American companies. The pressure against neutral stevedoring firms is secondary because the resulting cessation of business
between the entities trading with Soviets (the neutral shipping and import/export companies) and
the U.S.S.R. is utilized as a weapon against the foreign government. Furthermore, even if the
union's activities only achieve a partial cessation in business relations between American companies and a foreign government, the cease doing business object is nonetheless satisfied. See NLRB
v. Local 825, Int'l Union Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1971) (secondary boycott
provision is read too narrowly if complete termination of business relationship between neutral
and primary is required); NLRB v. Local 830, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 281 F.2d 319, 321 (3d Cir.
1960) (eight instances of refusals to handle goods out of thousands is sufficient).
272 447 U.S. 607 (1980).

273 Id at 614-15.
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pected to inevitably threaten neutral employers with substantial economic loss. Such a conclusion was evidenced by the fact that
approximately eighty-five percent of Allied's products were imported
from the U.S.S.R.274 Second, regardless of whether the ILA intentionally calculated to cause a total cessation in the flow of goods between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the union was responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its conduct. To support this finding, the Board
reasoned that:
[The ILA] had every reason to foresee with absolute clarity.

. .

that Rus-

sian goods would not be moved by any employees in any of the ports
encompassed by the boycott... and that Allied would be forced to cease
purchasing Russian wood for delivery to ports affected by the boycott
[Thus,] under the rationale of Safeco, [the union] must be held
....
accountable for the foreseeable consequences of [its] conduct . . . and

must be held to have induced the boycott with an object of forcing
the business entities involved to cease business operations among themselves and to cease handling goods of the U.S.S.R.2 75
Since the boycott presented neutral employers such as Allied with the
choice between economic survival and the severance of their business
relationships with the Soviet Union, the ILA's conduct contravened
section 8(b)(4)(ii).
A comparison of the analyses utilized by the First Circuit and the
NLRB reveals that the former accords with the premise of the protest
boycott theory. The pressure directed against neutral companies trading with the Soviet Union is unlawful, as the purpose of the boycott is
to force American employers to cease doing business with the Soviet
Union. In the words of the First Circuit, "when a union orders all
employees of a neutral employer to cease handling goods originating
from a particular source, it is afortioriforcing the employer to cease
doing business with that source."27 6 In contrast, the reasoning of the
Board implies that a protest boycott stems from an unlawful object
only in situations where the foreseeable consequences of the union's
pressure "inevitably. . . threatens [a neutral employer] with substantial economic loss. ''277 Whereas the protest boycott theory and the ra-

tionale of the First Circuit would deem the object of the ILA's boycott
against neutral employers dealing with the Soviet Union to be illegal,
the approach of the Board is narrower as it envisions that the object of
274 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1041. These imports amounted to approximately
$25 million annually. Id
275 Id

at 1042.

276 640 F.2d at 1375 (emphasis in original).
277 See text accompanying notes 272-75 supra.
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union activity is unlawful only if neutral employers are faced with the

near total collapse of their business.
The nature of protest boycotts belies the validity of the Board's
determination that the object of such union activity is unlawful only in

situations directly analogous to Retail Store Employees. Since protest
boycotts are confined to secondary employers and calculated to satisfy
union objectives unrelated to labor-management relations, the union's
object is illegal. This view accords with the factual circumstances un-

derlying the Russian trade boycott. First, courts examining the circumstances under which the ILA instituted the Russian trade boycott
concluded that the boycott campaign was implemented by the union's

hierarchy, rather than, as ILA President Gleason represented it to be, a
grass-roots movement amongst the union's rank and file.27 Such evidence suggests that the union's leadership sought to inflict economic

harm upon the U.S.S.R. in retaliation for its military adventurism.
Moreover, these findings counsel against acceptance of the ILA's claim

that the boycott constituted a primary protest since the sole object was
to vindicate the consciences of the union's membership by refusing to
load Russian cargoes. Secondly, in argument before the Baldovin
court, ILA lawyers admitted that the infliction of economic harm upon

the Soviet Union was one goal of the protest boycott:
[1longshoremen will not supply their labor to contribute, directly or indirectly to the aggressor's cause . . . [as] an incidentalpurposeis to bring
pressure to bear on the Soviets to induce their withdrawalfromthe invaded
territoryandtheir cessation of militarydesigns .... The present contro-

versy involves a passive form of protest by ILA members against aiding
or abetting Soviet aggression ....279
278 See note 258 supra. In addition, Gleason asserted that the boycott will cost the Soviet
Union "millions of dollars" and will involve "millions of tons of cargo." Statement of Thomas
Gleason (Jan. 16, 1980), reprintedin[1980] 13 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-7. Another economic
weapon launched against the Soviet Union by the boycott was aimed at eliminating the carriage of
goods from the United States to European ports by Russian vessels. In this regard, Gleason stated
that U.S. shipping companies would prosper under the boycott because traders using Soviet-flag
ships for the shipments were only "looking for the cheapest way to Hamburg, West Germany."
Statement of Thomas Gleason (Feb. 7, 1980), reprintedin [1980] 294 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-5.
279 Brief of ILA at 16-17, 26 (emphasis added), Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980). See also BriefoflLA at 14 ("the ILA's refusal to work is...
primary, with no object but to affect the conduct of the longshoremen.., and, perhaps, the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union"), 16 ("the overriding object remains the vindication of longshoremen's [sic] own convictions... as [r]ealistically, the ILA does not expect its refusal to exert
significant influence on the Politbureau"), 20 ("the sole object of the activity is the conduct of the
employees themselves-or at most to affect the military policy of a foreign country . . ."), id.;
Reply Brief of ILA at 16 ("the ILA's action is nothing more than to satisfy its' members con-
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The fact that the potential for inducing the U.S.S.R. to withdraw
its forces from Afghanistan may be remote does not detract from the
theory that an objective of the boycott was to pressure the Soviet Union
by stifling it foreign trade with the United States. Thus, in examining
the position of a neutral employer in the context of the Russian trade
boycott, and asking whether a cessation of his business is being employed by the ILA for its effect elsewhere-in order to give expression,
symbolically or in reprisal, of its disapproval of the U.S.S.R.-one can
see that a neutral party is entitled to protection from protest boycotts
under section 8(b)(4).2 8 °
IV.

FEDERAL CONTROL OVER PROTEST BOYCOTTS

On April 24, 1981, President Reagan officially removed trade controls on exports of agricultural commodities and phosphates which
were imposed against the Soviet Union fifteen months earlier following
its invasion of Afghanistan. 281 Immediately thereafter, the ILA announced its support for the President's action and terminated its boycott of Russian cargoes and ships.2 82 While some data suggests that
government export controls were largely responsible for the decline in
American-Soviet trade during 1980,283 the longshoremen's protest boysciences by not contributing their own services to the Soviet Union with, perhaps, an added hope
of influencing the Soviets to behave"), id These statements, and others made by ILA President
Gleason, see note 278 supra, indicate that at least one object of the boycott was to utilize the
resulting cessation of business for its effect upon the U.S.S.R. Conduct with such an intermediate
object, if proscribed, is not protected merely because the "ultimate" object is beyond the proscription of the Act. See notes 264-66 supra.
280 Private parties therefore have several remedies to counter protest boycotts. First, unfair
labor practices can be filed with the NLRB alleging a violation of § 8(b)(4). Under § 10(1), the
Board will then seek injunctive relief from a federal district court pending adjudication of the
alleged unfair labor practice. See, eg., Mack v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 104
L.R.R.M. 2892 (S.D. Ga. 1980). Thereafter, cease and desist orders will be issued by the Board
upon a finding that the union conduct violates the Act. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied Intl, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 108 L.R.R.M. 1033 (Aug. 28, 1981). Enforcement may be secured by an order from an appropriate United States court of appeals. NLRA
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Violation of such an order is also punishable by an action for
contempt. Id. Finally, § 303 allows a suit for damages caused by violations of § 8(b)(4). LMRA
§ 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976); see, eg., Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1981).
281 See 17 WEEKLY CoMp. OF PRES. Doc. 465 (April 24, 1981). See also N.Y. Times, April 25,
at 1,coL 5; id, April 26, at 1, coL 6. Several Congressmen, however, have introduced a resolution
urging the administration to reimpose an embargo against the U.S.S.R See H. Con. Res. 141,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H 2614 (daily ed. June 3, 1981).
282 [1981] 355 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-2.
283 In its 25th quarterly report on trade with non-market economies, the International Trade
Commission (ITC) attributed the "relatively unimpressive" trade level between the United States
and the communist world in 1980 as "primarily the result of the imposition of trade sanctions" on
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cott undoubtedly impacted upon Russian trade. First, the protest boycott prevented Soviet imports from entering ILA-controlled ports in the
Great Lakes and along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Since neither the
Carter nor Reagan administrations restricted imports from the
U.S.S.R., the longshoremens' action significantly contributed to the
overall decline in import trade levels between the two countries. 2 84
Secondly, the ILA effectively blocked the export of 3.5 million metric
tons of agricultural commodities which President Carter exempted
from export controls.28 5 As a result, the government assumed contracts
for the agricultural commodities stranded in U.S. ports at considerable
cost to the American taxpayer.2 8 6 Finally, the extent to which the
ILA's action may have discouraged potential trade cannot be measured. Many businessmen who might have otherwise engaged in trade
with the U.S.S.R. may have been deterred by the Russian trade boycott. Likewise, due to the inability of the executive branch to negotiate
an end to the ILA's boycott campaign and the disinclination of federal
courts to enjoin the longshoremen's action, the spectre of protest boycotts may well inhibit the formation of future Soviet trade relationship
by American companies.
The significance of the Russian trade boycott, however, transcends
the monetary losses experienced by American exporters and importers.
Rather, the protest boycott of the ILA represented a direct challenge to
the executive branch's management of foreign policy decision-making
the Soviet Union. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, TWENTY-FIFH QuARTERLY REPORT ON TRADE WITH NON-MARKET ECONOMIES (ITC Pub. No. 1136) (Mar. 1981), reprintedin
[1981] 74 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-13. According to the ITC, the
level of trade between the United States and communist countries rose 3% during 1980, compared
to trade increases of 53% in 1979 and 52% in 1978. Id In addition, while the Soviet Union had
been the United States' leading communist trade partner, accounting for more than 40% of U.S.
exports (with 70% of that in agricultural products) and 30% of U.S. imports, trade between the two
countries declined by more than 50% in 1980. Id
284 Explicit data regarding the effect of the ILA's boycott on imports is difficult to obtain. Soviet imports gained entrance to Pacific ports throughout the period of the ILA boycott, as West
Coast longshoremen refused to join in the Russian trade boycott. See note 72 supra. In addition,
the ILA's policy throughout its boycott campaign was to obey court injunctions of their strike
against Soviet cargoes and ships. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. Thus, in ports where
courts enjoined ILA locals, Soviet imports gained admittance to the United States. See notes 8687 and 92 supra. Therefore, the ILA was unsuccessful in achieving a total exclusion of U.S.S.R.
imports from American ports.
285 See text accompanying notes 76-78 SUpra.
286 On February 1, 1980, the government reached final agreement with 13 grain exporting companies for the assumption of suspended Soviet contracts of approximately 16 million metric tons
of wheat and corn. [1980] 293 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-14. Officials
from the Department of Agriculture estimated that the contract buy-up program would cost the
government $2.5 billion. Id
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and the frustration of congressional policies fostering American participation in foreign trade. Accordingly, this potential for impairment of
presidential and congressional foreign policies raises the question of
the means of controlling protest boycotts. Effective authority over foreign affairs and enforcement of international trade programs may require legislation prohibiting labor union interference with foreign
commerce. Yet, even if the federal government can constitutionally restrain protest boycotts, one must also ask if the full exercise of such a
power is in the national interest. While the former issue is one of constitutional law, the latter focuses upon policy considerations.
A. The Scope of Federal Power
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) 287 manifests a con-

gressional intent "to encourage trade with all countries with which the
United States has diplomatic or trading relations . .

,288 This for-

eign trade policy is implemented through a system of licenses and export controls, and is based upon the power of Congress "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States." 289 The
statute also grants power to the President to prohibit or curtail the exportation of goods and technology "to the extent necessary to further
...the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations. 29° Protest boycotts, however, discourage
American exporting and importing businesses acting in accord with
stated government policy. In addition, insofar as labor union protest
activities may block exports from leaving American ports, the President's control of exports for foreign policy purposes under the EAA
may be subjected to unwarranted private pressure. Likewise, protest
boycotts are antithetical to the concept of Congress' absolute power
over foreign commerce.
Legislative regulation of protest boycott activity might therefore be
premised upon the commerce clause. The purpose of such legislation
would be to prevent labor interference with goods moving through/foreign commerce. As one scholar has noted:
Under the-[foreign commerce clause], Congress has no less authority over
foreign commerce than it has over interstate commerce. And since the
287 Pub. L. No. 96-72, §§ 1-21, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420
(Supp. 111 1979)) [hereinafter cited as EAA].
288 EAA § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1) (Supp. 11 1979).
289 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cL 3. It is well established that congressional power over foreign
commerce is absolute. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
290 EAA § 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(1) (Supp. I1 1979). For a discussion of the EAA's approach to foreign policy controls, see Abbott, supra note 67, at 858-73.
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revolution initiated by [NLRB v.]Jones & Laughlin [Steel Corp.,] it no
longer needs citation of authority or argument that under the commerce
power Congress. . .can reach matters precedent to or subsequent to interstate or foreign commerce. . . . [In addition,] it can reach strictly local commerce and activities when necessary to make effective a regulation
of interstate or foreign commerce.29 1

Therefore, Congress has a broad mandate to regulate interferences with
its control over the foreign commerce of the United States.2 92

The federal government could be empowered to restrain protest
boycotts through various legislative measures. First, Congress might
provide a mechanism to prevent protest boycotts by amending the national emergency provisions of the NLRA. 293 These provisions authorize the President to seek injunctive relief against threatened or actual

strikes, which "if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the
national health or safety.

...
94 Labor union interference with for-

291 Henkin, The Treaty Makers andthe Law Makers: The Law ofthe Landand Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 914-15 (1959) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as Henkin]. As
the Supreme Court has most recently noted:
Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern ....
Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl.
3, grants congress power to regulate commerce "with foreign nations"
and "among the several states" in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater. Cases of this Court,
stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other nations, echo this distinction.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (citations omitted).
292 Another basis for congressional regulation may stem from the "foreign relations" power.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention such a power, numerous decisions have
referred to the federal government's inherent power in the field of foreign affairs. See Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936). In one instance, a court has determined that the "federal government's power over foreign
affairs" includes the authority "to prohibit any disturbance or interference with" the administration of American foreign policy. United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Elliott involved an indictment under the Logan Act for conspiring in the United States to destroy
a bridge in Zambia for the purpose of profiting from an ensuing mineral shortage. In denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the court asserted:
The federal government's power over foreign affairs comprises not only authority to regulate
relations with foreign countries but also to prohibit any disturbance or interference with external affairs. The offense charged.. . would have disrupted the economy of a nation...
[and] would have seriously affected American relations with Zambia. The prevention of the
deed and the prosecution of the culprits. . . makes such proceedings imperative and is well
within the legitimate interest of the United States Government.
Id at 323 (citations omitted). Commentators have also suggested that the foreign affairs power of
Congress authorizes "legislation on any subject which deals with, or relates to, or affects the relations of the United States with other nations." Henkin, supra note 291, at 922-24.
293 NLRA §§ 206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1976).
294 NLRA § 208(a), 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1976). Strikes undertaken by the ILA account for
nearly 30% of the occasions in which Presidents have invoked the emergency dispute provisions.
Curtin, TransportationStrikes and the Public Interest, 58 GEO. L.J. 243, 246-47 (1969).
One might argue that not all protest boycotts are of sufficient duration or economic effect to
imperil the "national health or safety." Cf.United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Local 418, 335 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. 111.
1971) (strike by dockworkers imperiling national market for
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eign trade could be eliminated by granting the President the power to
restrain conduct which threatens federal control over foreign commerce. Alternatively, Congress could formulate legislation allowing
the federal government to seek injunctions similar to the section 10(1)
remedies provided for in the NLRA.295 This section allows the NLRB
to seek injunctive relief of certain unfair labor practices on behalf of
private party complainants pending Board adjudication of the alleged
charge. Accordingly, legislation could authorize the federal government to petition for an injunction as a guardian of the public interest
whenever protest boycotts cause disruption in the conduct of foreign
affairs. Finally, the reach of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 96 which withdraws the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions of "labor
disputes,"2 97 could be clarified with appropriate legislation to allow injunctions against protest boycotts. The federal government could then
be afforded the power to enjoin such boycotts in circumstances where
labor unions inhibit the transportation of goods in foreign commerce.
B. Is Federal Control Warranted?
The issue of the propriety of federal control of labor activities directed against foreign governments involves a consideration of whether
the exercise of such power is consistent with national interests. In turn,
the resolution of this issue rests upon identifying what, if any, restraints
upon labor union behavior are justified to ensure a successful control of
grain is insufficient to warrant application of national emergency provisions). However, even the
institution of a protest boycott by a local union in a single port may touch off an international
incident and cause severe dislocations for American foreign commerce. See note 41 supra. Thus,

the amendment of the national emergency provisions may be a viable means of preventing protest
boycotts.
295 See note 84 supra.
296 Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15

(1976)) [hereinafter cited as NLA].
297 The Act provides that "[n]o court of the United States. . . shall have jurisdiction to issue
any... injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute... ?' NLA § 1, 29
U.S.C. § 101 (1976). A "labor dispute" is defined as including "any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment. . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Id § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976). Since protest
boycotts are undertaken to express political, as opposed to economic views, one may argue that
the NLA is inapplicable to activities such as the Russian trade boycott. Several lower courts have
accepted this suggestion. See Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1960); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1408,
No. 80-81-Civ.-J-B (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 1980); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. International Long-

shoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), aj'd,531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976). But see
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local No. 1418, 626 F.2d 455
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsubno=., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Long-

shoremen's Ass'n, Local 1408, 49 U.S.L.W. 3722 (Mar. 31 1981) (No. 80-1045)."
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foreign policy. Unions engaged in activities similar to the Russian
trade boycott may argue that their conduct constitutes political action
entitled to first amendment protection. In contrast, those responsible
for foreign policy decisions may condemn labor union interferences as
detrimental to federal management of international affairs and foreign
commerce. Likewise, American firms participating in international
business markets pursuant to foreign trade policies may support control
of protest boycotts on the grounds that such conduct is beyond the enclaves of the first amendment.
Federal regulation of protest boycotts is desirable from the standpoint of maintaining national control over the administration of international relations. Labor union activities arising from an unwillingness
to abide by foreign policy decisions interfere with the exercise of government authority over foreign affairs. Indeed, ILA boycotts instituted
to eliminate trade with Cuba and North Vietnam illustrate the extent to
which labor unions may undermine government policies.2 9 8 Second,

protest boycotts may harm relations with American allies when labor
unions endeavor to take foreign policy into their own hands. For example, ILA boycotts undertaken in the early 1960's against European
shipping lines trading with Cuba strained American and European cooperative efforts to deal with Castro's Cuba.2 9 9 Likewise, protest boycotts add to the complex and difficult task of implementing American
foreign policy. Unfriendly or less informed governments may fail to
distinguish between official administration policies and labor union
conduct, and may interpret unrestrained protest boycott activities to belie the government's declared policy or indicate official weakness and
indecision. The continuance of the ILA's boycott of exports bound for
Iran after the conclusion of the recent hostage crisis may, for example,
have increased the difficulties attendant to the restoration of normal
relations. 300 Accordingly, federal regulation of protest boycotts would
reverse the erosion of government control over foreign affairs permitted
by successive administrations over the past three decades.
Federal regulation of protest boycotts is also desirable in order to
facilitate the implementation of American foreign trade policies. Protest boycotts interfere with the international business transactions of
American companies participating in foreign trade pursuant to government policies encouraging exports and imports. The liberalization in
298 See notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra.
299 See notes 52-56 supra.
300 The ILA continued its boycott of cargoes bound for Iran for more than 2 months after the
conclusion of the hostage crisis. See note 39 spra.
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post-World War II trade with communist countries which can be attributed to presidential and congressional initiatives in foreign trade
policy"' is wholly inconsistent with inaction by the federal government
in the face of protest boycotts. This inconsistency betrays and injures
those citizens who have relied upon express trade policies. Moreover,
any disruption of international trade by private parties should be
checked in order to maintain national control over foreign commerce.
The climate in which foreign relations are conducted is both too heated
and delicate to allow a multiplicity of uncoordinated voices to participate. Finally, when labor unions deliberately interfere with foreign
trade policies, their actions are inimical to the democratic system of
government since even dissenting citizens must respect and conduct
themselves in accord with policies formulated through the legislative
process by their representatives.
Forceful counterarguments, however, counsel that federal control
may be unwarranted, if not improper. The aspects of political expression advanced through protest boycott activities, either directed at
other governments or voiced in dissent to American foreign policy,
would appear to come within the ambit of first amendment protection.
These fundamental values should not be subordinated to an exaggerated deference to foreign policy considerations. Clearly, the Constitution should not be implicitly repealed merely to ease the job of
American diplomats.
On the other hand, protest boycotts constitute more than mere expression. Labor union activity directed toward foreign governments is
objectionable for the very reason that it involves collateral consequences beyond speech. Nevertheless, even conduct lacking constitutional protection may have redeeming value despite its variance from
government foreign policy. Experience likewise demonstrates that
speech alone may not be a sufficient catalyst to promote socially useful
changes. The civil rights movement of the 1960's and protests directed
against United States military involvement in Southeast Asia bear out
this observation. Thus, the adverse effect of protest boycott activity
upon the administration of American foreign policy may be outweighed by the utility such conduct contributes toward the critical examination of government decision-making on the part of the citizenry.
Yet, one might contend that the critical function of dissent in a
democratic society may adequately, and more fully be served by expression properly within the protections of the first amendment. A nec301 See ADLER-KARLSSON, supra note 50, at 100-06; Bilder, supra note 151, at 843-62.
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essary corollary of this concept brings dissent that exceeds the bounds

of constitutional freedoms within the scope of government regulation.
Accordingly, labor unions may dissent from the foreign policy decisions of government officials through democratic channels.3 2 Protest
boycotts are improper for the reason that labor unions are not entitled
to make decisions normally made by government officials. Therefore,
as legitimate avenues of union dissent may be pursued without the
harm typified by the Russian trade boycott, federal control over protest
boycotts is warranted.
Finally, whether the protest boycott theory enunciated in the foregoing section is accepted, or regulation proceeds at the local level under
the rationale of the Baldovin decision, federal control is preferable to
reliance upon private parties to control or enjoin protest boycotts. Private parties may be unwilling to bear the expense of suits to challenge
protest boycotts, especially in situations where the firm's participation
in foreign trade is a minor component of their business. Thus, to the
extent protest activities go unchallenged in various localities, the appearance of national unity in the international arena is unattainable.
Moreover, even if each local union's participation in a protest boycott
is challenged in applicable state forums, the potential for conflicting
decisions despite identical factual patterns might contribute to an em302 As Senator Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed in his opposition to the ILA's protest boycott against Egyptian ships in 1960:
There are constitutional channels through which citizens can bring about changes in the conduct of foreign policy. Actions on the part of the individuals or organizations which interfere
directly or indirectly with the constitutional exercise of government authority or activity in
the conduct of foreign policy, however ... [is] inimical to the total national interest.
111 CONG. REc. 18, 232 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Fulbright); see also 106 CONG. REc. 8625-26
(1965) (remarks of Sen. Fulbright). In light of the political strength of organized labor, see notes
20-23 and accompanying text supra, unions, through their sheer numbers, may exert considerable
influence over the formation of American foreign policy.
Unions may also employ alternative means otherwise unavailable to the citizenry to express
their disapproval of American foreign policy or the conduct of foreign governments. These measures may include instituting legal proceedings against foreign governments, see [1980] 52 INr'L
TRADE RaP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-15, 17 (United Auto Workers Union petition for
import relief under § 201(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, on account of the influx of Japanese
automobiles into the U.S. market, denied by the Int'l Trade Comm.); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
aftdon other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit by union alleging that the price-setting
activities of OPEC violated § 1 of the Sherman Act dismissed as union members were indirect
purchasers from the defendants and thus precluded from seeking damages and injunctive relief),
and withholding investments of pension fund assets in companies refusing to condemn the social
policies of particular foreign governments. See [1979] 263 P N. REP. (BNA) at A-28, 29; Detroit
Free Press, June 23, 1980, at 3, col. 3 (UAW-Chrysler agreement to cease investment of pension
funds in companies named by the union as operating in South Africa without supporting the
elimination of apartheid).
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barrassment in foreign affairs. 3 3 Therefore, authority to control protest boycotts should be afforded the federal government in light of the
important national interests such control would facilitate.
CONCLUSION

The Russian trade boycott of 1980-81 is the most recent protest
boycott in a long history of labor union interferences with foreign trade
policy and the government's conduct of international relations. This
Comment contends that federal labor laws should be deemed applicable to protest boycotts. First, the assertion of jurisdiction over protest
boycotts is consistent with the underlying policies of the NLRA. The
rationale of the Supreme Court's flag-of-convenience vessel cases is
therefore distinguishable in the context of protest boycotts. Second, a
proper construction of the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA
proscribes labor union pressures directed against domestic companies
engaged in foreign trade. Failure to accord the protection of section
8(b)(4) to neutral companies from politically-inspired protest activities
would render the prohibition devoid of function. Third, federal control
of protest boycotts would appear to be desirable to prevent foreign affairs problems. Remedial legislation authorizing the government to enjoin protest boycotts is suggested. Moreover, in light of the increasing
penetration of foreign markets by American companies, the resolution
of the coverage of protest boycotts under federal labor laws is crucial to
the continuing viability of United State foreign trade policies. Thus,
the need is manifest for a clear rule or statute capably addressed to
these labor union activities which impact dramatically upon an area of
national concern.
GeraldL. Maatman, Jr.**

303 Protest boycotts are likely to receive disparate treatment under state laws. See text accompanying notes 160-66 supra. The potential for conflicting decisions, however, is not limited to
state courts. Compare Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1980) and NLRB v. Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th
Cir. 1964), with Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir.

1981).
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